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Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era  
 
Rory Van Loo 
 
Like police officers patrolling the streets for crime, the front lines for most large business regulators---
Environmental Protection Agency engineers, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau examiners, and Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission inspectors, among others---decides when and how to enforce the law. These regulatory monitors 
guard against toxic air, financial ruin, and deadly explosions. Yet whereas scholars devote considerable attention to 
police officers in criminal law enforcement, they have paid limited attention to the structural role of regulatory monitors 
in civil law enforcement. This Article is the first to chronicle the statutory rise of regulatory monitors and to situate 
them empirically at the core of modern administrative power. Since the Civil War, often in response to crises, the largest 
federal regulators have steadily accrued authority to collect documents remotely and enter private space without any 
suspicion of wrongdoing. Those exercising this monitoring authority within agencies administer the law at least as much 
as the groups that are the focus of legal scholarship: enforcement lawyers, administrative law judges, and rule writers. 
Regulatory monitors wield sanctions, influence rulemaking, and create quasi--common law. Moreover, they offer a 
better fit than lawyers for the modern era of “collaborative governance” and corporate compliance departments because 
their principal function---information collection---is less adversarial. Yet unlike litigation and rulemaking, monitoring-
based decisions are largely unobservable by the public, often unreviewable by courts, and explicitly excluded by the 
Administrative Procedure Act. The regulatory-monitor function can thus be more easily ramped up or deconstructed by 
the President, interest groups, and agency directors. A better understanding of regulatory monitors---and their 
relationship with regulatory lawyers---is vital to designing democratic accountability not only during times of political 
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Upton Sinclair’s 1906 novel The Jungle provoked public outcry by graphically exposing 
American meatpacking industry health violations, such as vermin infestations,1 prompting lawmakers 
to charge the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) with inspecting facilities nationwide.2 After 
the subprime mortgage crisis helped push the economy to the edge of a cliff in 2008, a new agency 
was created--the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)--with the first federal mandate to 
routinely examine mortgage servicers and payday lenders.3 When the Deepwater Horizon oil rig 
exploded and sank off the Gulf Coast in 2010, arguably the “worst environmental disaster in U.S. 
history,”4 the Department of the Interior dissolved the responsible agency, created three in its place, 
and has since doubled the number of offshore energy inspectors.5 
These incidents expanded administrative agencies’ authority not only to litigate but also to 
monitor.6 Monitoring authority enables agencies to regularly collect nonpublic information from 
firms without suspicion of wrongdoing. Under the Bush and Obama Administrations alone, in 
addition to the subprime-mortgage crisis and Deepwater oil spill, public backlash prompted 
monitor-enhancing legislation to keep lead out of children’s toys;7 prevent salmonella deaths from 
tainted peanut butter, ice cream, and other packaged foods;8 and reduce prescription drug price 
                     
1 See Roger Roots, A Muckraker’s Aftermath: The Jungle of Meat-Packing Regulation After a Century, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. 
Rev. 2413, 2413 (2001). 
2 Meat Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 59-242, 34 Stat. 1260 (1907) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 601--695 (2012)).  
3 See Dodd--Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491--5492, 5493(c)(2)(A) (2012).  
4 David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental Crime, and the Criminal Law, 109 
Mich. L. Rev. 1413, 1414 (2011). 
5 See U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Secretarial Order No. 3299, Amendment No. 2, Establishment of the Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue 
(2011) (reassigning the  Minerals Management Service into three new agencies). , including the 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/elips/documents/3299a2-
establishment_of_the_bureau_of_ocean_energy_management_the_bureau_of_safety_and_environmental_enforcement_and_t
he_office_of_natural_resources_revenue.pdf, ; For a description of the lax approach to regulating offshore drilling in the Gulf 
of Mexico and recommendations for an overhaul of the monitoring scheme, see Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon 
Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling 28--30, 78--79, 293, 299 
(2011) [hereinafter Deepwater Report], https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-
OILCOMMISSION.pdf [https://perma.cc/YF2Q-D5LF]; see also Bureau of Safety & Envtl. Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior 
Budget Justifications and Performance Information Fiscal Year 2017, at 55--56 (2017) [hereinafter BSEE Budget] (describing 
how the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement is expanding its workforce of offshore energy inspectors). 
6 On policy makers’ broader responses to such major crises, see, e.g., POLICY SHOCK: RECALIBRATING RISK AND 
REGULATION AFTER OIL SPILLS, NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS AND FINANCIAL CRISES (Edward J. Balleisen, , Lori S. Bennear, 
Kimberly D. Krawiec & Jonathan B. Wiener, eds., 2017).  
7 Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122 Stat. 3016 (codified in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C.) (expanding inspections). For a summary of how lead concerns in toys have influenced legislation, see Eileen 
Flaherty, Note, Safety First: The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, 21 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 372, 380--84 
(2009).  
8 FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C.). For a discussion of the impact of salmonella deaths leading to the passage of the Act, see Debra M. Strauss, An 
Analysis of the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act: Protection for Consumers and Boon for Business, 66 Food & Drug L.J. 
353, 353--54 (2011).  
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manipulation.9 Whereas the literature has paid considerable attention to administrative rulemaking 
and adjudication, it has left the story of the rise of regulatory monitoring largely untold.10  
Some agencies describe monitoring as their “backbone”11 or “core,”12 and it is surely not lost 
on administrative observers that it is a meaningful part of what agencies do.13 Less obvious is why the 
responsible bureaucrats---some of whom wear hard hats and goggles to inspect dangerous 
machinery, search for “black rot, white rot, yellow rot” in food manufacturing plants,14 or pore 
through accounting ledgers---merit the kind of sustained legal scholarly attention given to those 
writing rules and litigating cases.  
This Article’s primary goal is to sketch regulatory monitors’ place in the federal regulatory 
architecture. It examines their statutory rise and workforce size at all nineteen “large” federal 
regulators.15 By drawing on employee manuals, agency annual reports, Congressional budget 
requests, job postings, and interviews, it also begins to piece together the enforcement role that 
regulatory monitors play and how that role relates to agency functions occupied by lawyers.16 In 
short, it situates regulatory monitors at the center of administrative power. 
Just as it would be incomplete to analyze criminal law enforcement without distinguishing 
police officers from prosecutors, this Article shows that a part of administrative law is missing 
without distinguishing regulatory monitors from agency enforcement lawyers. To be clear, police 
officers are unique in terms of state authority by having the discretion to use physical force and 
                     
9 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461--
64 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). (requiring pharmaceutical companies to report pricing information 
to the FTC) 
10 The literature has also provided broad accounts of administrative surveillance aimed at private individuals for other 
purposes. See, e.g., Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 1039, 1043 (2016) 
(describing how the administrative state engages in “sweeping surveillance activity” that must be integrated with the “law and 
theory of the Fourth Amendment”). It has also covered court-ordered monitoring. See, e.g., Veronica Root, The Monitor-
“Client” Relationship, 100 Va. L. Rev. 523, 531--33 (2014). 
11 Guy Hayes, A Day in the Life of an Inspector, Bureau of Safety & Envtl. Enf’t, 
https://www.bsee.gov/newsroom/feature-stories/a-day-in-the-life-of-an-inspector [https://perma.cc/YP6M-Y5BG] (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2018). 
12 U.S. Dep’t of Agric., One Team, One Purpose 15 (2013) [hereinafter USDA Inspection], 
https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/7a35776b-4717-43b5-b0ce-aeec64489fbd/mission-
book.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/NLH4-SZPK]. 
13 See Gary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law 10 (6th ed. 2007) (acknowledging that most agency activity lies outside 
lawyerly roles); Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 Theoretical Inquiries L. 369, 396 (2016) 
(“[T]he two modalities [of rulemaking and adjudication] are not so much opposites as they are endpoints on a continuum, and . 
. . a great deal of agency activity occurs in the space between them.”); cf. Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: 
The Theory and Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 Duke L.J. 133, 142 (2014) (“Topics such as . . . 
inspections and monitoring . . . deserve more attention than we can give here.”); William H. Simon, The Organizational 
Premises of Administrative Law, 78 Law & Contemp. Probs., nos. 1 & 2, 2015, at 61, 70 (describing both main administrative 
law paradigms after World War II as relying on monitoring by agencies).  
14 FDA, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, No. PB2013-110462, Food Code 468 (2013). 
15 See infra section I.B (defining large regulators and discussing the methodology used to identify them). 
16 Publicly available documents were sufficient for most of these agencies’ roles and responsibilities, but to fill in some 
gaps and to improve accuracy at least one interview was conducted with a current or former employee at each of the agencies 
or departments studied. Interviews were semistructured, with anonymous interviewees located through chain referral. For a 
similar interview methodology and review of the literature discussing limitations of such an approach, see, e.g., John 
Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1539, 1551 (2017).  
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immediately take away life or liberty. And individuals are arguably more powerless in the face of 
police officers than businesses are in the face of bureaucrats.  
While most regulatory monitors do not wield guns,17 they stand between life and death 
through safety inspections of airplanes, nuclear facilities, highway vehicles, and food. Although 
regulatory monitors cannot immediately arrest individuals, they may identify criminal wrongdoing, 
such as embezzlement, leading to imprisonment,18 and can limit a business owner’s freedom to earn 
a livelihood by ordering the immediate shutdown of oil-drilling operations or food manufacturing.19 
They also protect against devastating nonphysical threats by patrolling financial institutions for 
conduct that could cost families their homes or collapse the economy. Furthermore, regulatory 
monitors have a forceful informal sanction: the ability to ramp up inspection frequency and 
intensity, which itself inflicts pain and costs.20 With monitoring, as with policing, sometimes the 
process is the punishment.21  
The analogy to police officers is illustrative because both groups have a patrol function at 
their core and make frontline law enforcement decisions. But the comparison structurally 
understates regulatory-monitor authority in three main ways. First, police have more constitutional 
constraints placed on them. Whereas police officers must generally have probable cause or a search 
warrant to enter private space, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment constrains 
regulatory searches far less.22 Unlike police officers, for instance, Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) inspectors can enter private spaces without any suspicion of wrongdoing to make 
observations or collect samples so long as it is part of a “general neutral administrative plan.”23 
Second, the power of regulatory monitors in many agencies extends further along the 
spectrum of enforcement authority. According to one prominent account, “the most significant 
                     
17 For a list of federal agencies with full-time staff, see Robert Longley, Firearms and Arrest Authority of U.S. Federal Agencies, 
https://www.thoughtco.com/firearms-and-arrest-authority-federal-agencies-3321279 (last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (listing the 
EPA as having 202 and the FDA as having 183 full-time personnel with firearms). 
18 See, e.g., National Banking Act of 1864, 12 U.S.C. § 38 (2012) (charging bank examiners with identifying embezzlement 
and stating that deceiving a bank examiner is punishable by imprisonment); Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance: An 
Institutional Perspective (2017), http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/parrillo-agency-guidance-final-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JFP6-UHL4] (describing how the EPA can often pursue either civil or criminal penalties). 
19 Bureau of Safety & Envtl. Enf’t, Annual Report 2015, at 23--24 [hereinafter BSEE Annual Report], 
https://www.bsee.gov/sites/bsee_prod.opengov.ibmcloud.com/files/bsee_final_annual_report_2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GCV9-6GB5] (last visited Oct. 11, 2018) (discussing the Bureau’s enforcement approach, including using 
shutdowns).  
20 See infra section III.B.4. 
21 On process punishment in criminal law, see, e.g., Malcolm M. Feeley, The Process Is the Punishment: Handling Cases 
in a Lower Criminal Court 3--5 (2d ed. 1979). 
22 See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015) (“Search regimes where no warrant is ever required may 
be reasonable where ‘special needs . . . make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable’ and where the 
‘primary purpose’ of the searches is ‘[d]istinguishable from the general interest in crime control.’” (first quoting Skinner v. 
Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); then quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000); and 
then quoting id. at 44)); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313--14, 321 (1978). 
23 National-Standard Co. v. Adamkus, 881 F.2d 352, 361--63 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that EPA inspectors can conduct 
searches based on administrative warrants, which require either that (1) there is “specific evidence of an existing violation,” 
necessitating a lesser degree of probable cause than criminal warrants; or that (2) the search is “part of a general neutral 
administrative plan”). 
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design flaw in the federal criminal system” is prosecutors’ ability to enforce and adjudicate laws.24 In 
many agencies, regulatory monitors combine prosecutors’ enforcement and adjudication authority 
with the patrol function of police officers and investigatory function of detectives: They not only 
identify wrongdoers but also investigate, reach multimillion-dollar settlements, submit formal 
charges, and ultimately determine the fate of regulated entities.25  
Third, regulatory monitors may have greater influence on policymaking. Police officers have 
tremendous ability to arrest people in light of the breadth of potential violations on the books. 
Those violations are, however, part of a detailed code.26 Some regulatory monitors can go further by 
requesting internal business changes that advance principles, even if the original behavior was not 
clearly illegal---such as when a monitor believes a company’s internal process for reviewing legal 
complaints is likely to miss future violations.27 In terms of rulemaking, regulatory monitors post their 
employee manuals online, which businesses study intently to build compliance systems. Those 
manuals thereby shape industry behavior without any notice-and-comment process.28 Additionally, 
postvisit examination and inspection reports have become a meaningful body of common law, used 
by businesses to make their case in subsequent inspections.29 
A key backstory to regulatory monitors’ current status is the advent in recent decades of 
“new governance” models emphasizing collaborative regulation.30 As this Article argues below,31 the 
emphasis on collaborative regulation syncs better with inspectors and examiners---who “work 
alongside, not against[] industry”32---than with litigators, whose main powers rest on adversarial 
court proceedings. Current governance models also emphasize “continuous” information flows so 
that rules respond rapidly to firms’ conduct,33 inducing greater reliance on regulatory monitors’ real-
time data. Moreover, as courts, Congress, and the President have increasingly constrained agency 
                     
24 Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan. L. 
Rev. 869, 871 (2009) ] . 
25 See infra section III.B. 
26 To be clear, that code is expansive enough to give police officers tremendous power to arrest people. **source 
27 See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2075, 2124--25 (2016) 
(“The compliance function, in particular, is designed to inculcate norms of behavior that exceed narrow legal obligations.”). 
28 Parrillo, supra note 18, at 27 n.47. Courts have not, however, treated manuals as substantive rules having the force and 
effect of law in adjudications. See Disabled Am. Veterans v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 859 F.3d 1072, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(holding that an employee manual was not binding on the agency in adjudications and therefore was not required to go 
through notice-and-comment procedures nor subject to judicial review). 
29 See infra section III.C.1.  
30 See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 4--7 (1992); Jody 
Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 4 (1997) (calling for administrative law to 
follow a new normative direction in pursuit of “collaborative governance”); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of 
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342, 350--51, 371--76 (2004) 
(outlining a shift in the administrative state away from central control to a more partnership-driven model of governance 
focused on collaboration between agencies and various stakeholders). 
31 See infra section II.A.1. 
32 See Hayes, supra note 11. 
33 See Freeman, supra note 30, at 22, 28--29 (“Monitoring and information exchange are crucial to an effective 
implementation and compliance regime . . . .”).  
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rule writing and litigation,34 agencies would be expected to rely more on less-constrained monitoring 
activities to exercise authority.  
By situating regulatory monitors at the center of administrative power, this Article also 
places them at the intersection of leading public law conversations. One strand of scholarship has 
stressed the importance of the structural design of public institutions in incentivizing optimal 
acquisition of information---the “lifeblood of effective governance.”35 A major reason Congress 
created agencies was to undertake “specialized information-gathering” ill-suited for courts.36 This 
literature has also analyzed agencies’ external strategies for acquiring information---but focusing on 
agencies as unitary entities rather than looking at internal groups.37 
Another related strand of scholarship argues that standard depictions of administrative law 
are incomplete because “agencies are typically treated as unitary entities.”38 Congress and agency 
leaders allocate clout among various subagency offices, divisions, and decisionmakers.39 
Acknowledging these internal allocations improves understanding of “the most puzzling principles 
and doctrines of administrative law.”40 Early studies provided rich insights into agency organizational 
design, including the role of inspectors,41 “but the bulk of this work was done decades ago, largely in 
the context of administrative adjudication.”42 Since then, agencies’ regulatory approaches have 
shifted significantly, and adjudication has declined.43 Consequently, scholars have recently revived 
the project of “crack[ing] open the black box of agencies to peer inside”44 the organizational 
                     
34 See infra section II.A.3. 
35 Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1422, 1422 (2011).  
36 See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1273 n.338 
(1982). 
37 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and 
Regulatory Policymaking, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 277, 281--85 (2004) (”In this Article, we analyze regulators' gathering of 
information from firms as a strategic game.”). Professors Coglianese, Zeckhauser, and Parson mention regulatory monitors in 
passing, but they examine a broader set of information-collection mechanisms like phone conversations with industry experts, 
for a wider array of purposes, such as one-time rulemaking studies. See id. at 288--89, 305, 319--24.  
38 Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 Yale L.J. 1032, 1035 (2011). 
39 See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 38, at 1035--36 (offering a descriptive model of agencies that draws attention to how 
power is distributed between various offices and officials within an agency).  
40 Id. at 1035. 
41 See, e.g., Eugene Bardach & Robert A. Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness 73 
(1982) (discussing how agencies and inspectors have configured their operations to meet legislative demands for rule 
enforcement); John Braithwaite et al., An Enforcement Taxonomy of Regulatory Agencies, 9 Law & Pol’y 323, 324 (1987) 
(“Deterrence or sanctioning strategies seek to identify and detect breaches of law through patrol and inspection; they then seek 
to develop a case for the courts through investigation.”); see also Colin Diver, A Theory of Regulatory Enforcement, 28 Pub. 
Pol’y 257, 258 (1980) (discussing inspectors from a theoretical perspective). This Article draws on those early studies. 
However, that literature focuses on (a) mostly inspectors, (b) a different set of agencies, including state and local agencies and 
typically excluding those that regulate trade or finance, and (c) agencies’ overall regulatory approach rather than on regulatory 
monitors. See, e.g., Bardach & Kagan, supra, at 7 (“The focus of this book is on the social dimension of unreasonableness: the 
experience of being subjected to inefficient regulatory requirements.”). The literature thus lacks any systematic study of 
regulatory monitors as a distinct group across the largest federal agencies, leaving open the question of regulatory monitors’ 
origins and power in the modern administrative state. 
42 Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 428 (2015).  
43 See, e.g., id. For an overview of the governance and market transformations behind this shift, see infra Part II. 
44 Magill & Vermeule, supra note 38, at 1035. 
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structure of both rulemaking45 and enforcement.46 Others have looked more broadly at how to 
improve frontline decisionmakers, a category that includes inspectors and administrative law 
judges.47 
Despite the lack of sustained attention to regulatory monitors or articulation of their distinct 
role in the modern administrative state,48 these strands of literature indirectly lay the foundations for 
understanding how regulatory monitors are crucial to administrative law. For most agencies, 
regulatory monitors are an organizationally distinct group at the heart of the policymaking and 
enforcement black boxes.49 They are the gatekeepers for information, and thus for the “lifeblood” of 
agencies.50  
As such, regulatory monitors are relevant to administrative law’s central preoccupations. The 
overriding purpose of administrative law is the accountability of delegated authority. The 1946 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) enables courts and the public to check agencies.51 Yet 
regulatory monitors operate in the “soft” administrative law52 space largely exempted from the 
APA.53 Since regulatory monitors’ actions are less reviewable than those of more formal legal actors 
and the technical process of collecting information remains out of sight between crises, the rise of 
regulatory monitors potentially insulates agencies from public accountability. 
Finally, scholars have debated how the law should address external stakeholders competing 
for influence over agencies. The literature identifies mechanisms, such as cost--benefit analysis, that 
                     
45 See, e.g., Nou, supra note 42, at 422--25 (examining the internal divisions within agencies and how agency leaders 
deploy these divisions to advance its objectives). Professor Nou does not mention regulatory monitors and instead focuses on 
organizational mechanisms that give agency leaders control over information vital for decisionmaking, especially related to 
rulemaking. See id. at 429--31. 
46 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1129, 1130--31 (2016) 
(acknowledging that “[d]espite the centrality of enforcement to agency practice, enforcement discretion receives relatively little 
attention,” and “begin[ning] to catalog approaches for overseeing it”); Margaret H. Lemos, Democratic Enforcement? 
Accountability and Independence for the Litigation State, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 929, 942--43 (2017) (“[E]nforcement has 
inspired far less attention than rulemaking or adjudication. . . . This Article seeks to fill that gap.”). 
47 E.g., Daniel E. Ho, Does Peer Review Work? An Experiment of Experimentalism, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2017). Professor 
Ho underscores regulatory monitors’ importance by closely studying inspectors and emphasizing the “extensive discretion” of 
“frontline government officials carry[ing] out the law.” Id. at 5. His focus is on a broader function---frontline decisionmaking, 
which is exercised by other groups such as lawyers and judges---and a broader set of agencies---including local agencies that 
exercise adjudicatory power over individuals. See id at 5--10. Nonetheless, his work produces significant empirical and policy 
insights into regulatory monitors. See id. at 11--13. For earlier valuable empirical studies of inspectors, see, for example, 
Bardach & Kagan, supra note 41; Braithwaite et al., supra note 41. 
48 When broad administrative law conversations mention monitoring, it is often of agencies, not firms. See Nou, supra 
note 42, at 423 (noting “administrative law’s overwhelming focus on the influence of agencies’ external monitors”). 
49 See infra section I.A. 
50 See infra section I.B., Part III. 
51 It does so by, for example, involving the public in notice-and-comment rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). It also 
specifies judicial review of final agency action. See id. § 702. 
52 Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 
Harv. L. Rev. 1991, 2043--44 (2014) (noting that prudential regulators mostly operate using “soft law” rather than formal law 
such as notice-and-comment rulemaking).  
53 See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(3) (excepting “proceedings in which decisions rest solely on inspections” from the notice-and-
comment process). 
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alter the President’s ability to control a defiant bureaucracy.54 It also explores organizational design 
features that insulate agencies from industry capture.55 Regulatory monitors add another dimension 
to these discussions. For instance, in 1961, about a month into a new job as a frontline Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) examiner, Dr. Frances Kelsey received what her supervisors described 
as routine papers submitted for a new sleep aid used off-label for morning sickness.56 Despite 
intense pressure from the drug’s manufacturer, she withheld approval by repeatedly demanding 
more rigorous clinical evidence than the FDA typically required.57 It was ultimately discovered that 
in Germany alone the drug, thalidomide, had caused an estimated 10,000 incidents of deaths or 
shrunken or missing limbs in babies born to mothers who had taken the drug.58 Mass harm was 
averted in the United States because a frontline examiner stood firm in exercising her agency’s 
statutory power.59  
As powerful actors, regulatory monitors have in recent decades served as an important lever 
for any presidential ramp-up or drop-off in regulation.60 Most recently, as part of a planned 
“deconstruction of the administrative state,”61 President Trump has taken steps to make the FDA 
                     
54 See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1819--21 (1996) (discussing the 
nondelegation doctrine); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 123, 
176--79 (1994) (summarizing the checks and balances on presidential power over the administrative state); Elena Kagan, 
Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2253--72 (2001) (providing an overview of the ways agencies are 
constrained); Michael A. Livermore, Cost--Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 609, 614--15 (2014) 
(describing the way cost--benefit analysis constrains agencies); Kevin Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer 
the Laws, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 263, 267 (2006) (arguing that the President does not have the authority to act directly under a 
statute or bind the discretion of lower-level officials unless Congress directly grants such authority, in contrast to the operating 
assumption). 
55 See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15, 17--18 
(2010) (arguing that the analysis of an agency’s independence should shift from the traditional focus on insulation from the 
presidency to instead consider design features that prevent capture by interest groups). 
56 Bara Fintel, Athena T. Samaras & Edson Carias, The Thalidomide Tragedy: Lessons for Drug Safety and Regulation, 
Helix (July 28, 2009),  https://helix.northwestern.edu/article/thalidomide-tragedy-lessons-drug-safety-and-regulation 
[https://perma.cc/634D-7LS8]; see also Frances Oldham Kelsey, Autobiographical Reflections 44, 49--67 (unpublished 
manuscript), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/History/ResearchTeaching/OralHistories/UCM406132.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W7UX-KSRX] (chronicling the start of Dr. Kelsey’s thalidomide assignment at the FDA through the drug 
company’s withdrawal of the FDA application, as recalled by Dr. Kelsey). 
57 See S. Rep. No. 87-1744, at 40--42 (1962) (detailing over forty-six contacts by the drug’s manufacturer attempting to 
“expedite clearance,” including one with Dr. Kelsey’s immediate supervisor calling her letter “somewhat libelous” and 
requesting that pressure be applied to her). 
58 See Frederick Dove, What’s Happened to Thalidomide Babies?, BBC (Nov. 3, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-15536544 [https://perma.cc/Z26Y-Q9C4] (“No-one knows how many miscarriages 
the drug caused, but it’s estimated that, in Germany alone, 10,000 babies were born affected by Thalidomide. Many were too 
damaged to survive for long.”). 
59 See infra section I.C.2. 
60 See Holly Doremus, Data Gaps in Natural Resource Management: Sniffing for Leaks Along the Information Pipeline, 
83 Ind. L.J. 407, 427--29 (2008) (identifying “information extraction” programs as early cuts during environmental 
deregulation); OMB Watch, The Obama Approach to Public Protection: Enforcement 4 (2010), 
http://www.foreffectivegov.org/sites/default/files/regs/obamamidtermenforcementreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/2H8Q-
Q4AK] (citing an increase in regulatory-monitor activity under President Obama). 
61 Phillip Rucker & Robert Costa, Bannon Vows a Daily Fight for “Deconstruction of the Administrative State,” Wash. 
Post (Feb. 23, 2017) (quoting Steve Bannon’s statement) https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-wh-strategist-vows-a-
daily-fight-for-deconstruction-of-the-administrative-state/2017/02/23/03f6b8da-f9ea-11e6-bf01-d47f8cf9b643_story.html 
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drug-approval process “much faster,”62 and his appointees have moved to decrease federal 
inspections of polluting factories, examinations of banks, and monitoring of offshore oil platforms.63 
The ease with which such changes can be made varies by agency. At the FDA today, external 
influence faces more structural constraints than in the 1950s. Following the thalidomide incident, 
Congress codified the type of heightened reporting requirements that Dr. Kelsey had sought.64 
Streamlining the drug approval process would now largely depend on changes to the law rather than 
convincing a frontline examiner. A change in the law would mean greater visibility and public 
involvement. By contrast, in other agencies, legal rules and organizational structure leave regulatory 
monitors’ decision process more susceptible to alteration without public knowledge.65  
By mapping out this underappreciated administrative law of monitoring,66 the discussion 
below thus implicates broader concerns that regulatory enforcement lacks mechanisms for 
legitimacy such as those found in administrative rulemaking and adjudication.67 Indeed, given that 
monitoring makes up so much of agency activity, updating the legal framework for the modern era 
of monitoring would contribute to the important projects of designing agencies more effectively and 
making administrative law more administrative.68 Beyond more familiar mechanisms such as 
transparency, a team paradigm may be needed for the administrative state, with regulatory lawyers 
and regulatory monitors as coequal branches of administration. 
The discussion is structured as follows. Part I provides an overview of regulatory monitors 
by defining their distinct role in agencies and surveying their statutory emergence. Part II articulates 
the changes in governance and markets that have organizationally favored regulatory monitors more 
than rule writers and litigators. Part III begins to map out major organizational design choices. It 
provides the first quantitative and qualitative evidence indicating regulatory monitors’ presence and 
                                                                  
([https://perma.cc/8KJ3-5TRR])). 
62 See, e.g., David Crow, Pharma Stocks Rally on Trump Pledge to Speed Drug Approvals, Fin. Times (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/9bb59bd4-e7d7-11e6-893c-082c54a7f539 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting 
President Trump).  
63 See Eric Lipton & Danielle Ivory, Under Trump, E.P.A. Has Slowed Actions Against Polluters, and Put Limits on 
Enforcement Officers, N.Y. Times (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/10/us/politics/pollution-epa-
regulations.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (citing an EPA deputy administrator as stating that the agency “would 
back off some inspection” activity); Ted Mann, Regulators Propose Rollbacks to Offshore Drilling Safety Measures, Wall St. J. 
(Dec. 25, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-propose-rollbacks-to-offshore-drilling-safety-measures-1514206800 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
64 Sam Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug Amendments, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 
1049, 1049--52 (1973) (describing the statutory amendments passed in 1962 to strengthen FDA reporting requirements 
following congressional hearings related to the thalidomide incident). 
65 See infra section IV.A. 
66 Administrative law here is meant in its broader sense. See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 38, at 1056 (“Judicial review is 
but one corner of administrative law, which also involves statutes, executive orders, and other legal instruments that structure 
the agencies and the procedures they use.”). 
67 See Lemos, supra note 46, at 931--32 (“Despite its manifest importance, we lack a theoretical framework for assessing 
the legitimacy of public enforcement, or situating it in our broader scheme of democratic governance.”). 
68 See Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 95, 97 
(2003) (criticizing the APA for imposing an “essentially judicial concept of governance” that subjects agencies to 
“inappropriate procedural rigidities” instead of accommodating “new modes of governance” like priority setting and resource 
allocation).  
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influence across the largest independent and cabinet-level regulators. Part IV considers how future 
agency architects might improve the regulatory-monitor framework for more optimal governance. 
Designers could improve many agencies through transparency, mandated minimum numbers of 
inspections, appeals, appointments, and intra-agency coordination among lawyers and regulatory 
monitors. Above all, whether the goal is to guard against abuse of agency authority or business 
capture of bureaucrats, administrative law could benefit from viewing regulatory monitors as what 
they have become: dominant state actors vital to the well-being of firms and citizens.  
 
I. The Statutory Rise 
 
Unlike other actors in the typical administrative narrative, such as the rule writer and 
enforcement lawyer, regulatory monitors have a less-well-documented core power. Accordingly, this 
Part begins by providing a definition and then offers a brief historical overview of their 
accumulation of statutory monitoring authority across large regulators.  
 
A.  Regulatory Monitors as Distinct Actors 
 
This Article defines regulatory monitors as those whose core power is to regularly obtain 
nonpublic information from businesses outside the legal investigatory process. Monitoring can be 
broken down into two main types: visitation and reporting. Visitation authority allows regulators to 
physically enter private business space to observe or collect information. Reporting requires firms to 
remotely transmit information, such as business records, which are then received by regulatory 
monitors within the agency.69  
This seemingly straightforward authority does not easily fit into common descriptions of the 
administrative state. Legal treatments of administrative agencies typically break down their activities 
into rulemaking and enforcement, or sometimes into ex ante rulemaking and ex post enforcement.70 
Regulatory monitors arguably act ex ante because they aim to “secure compliance before violations 
occur.”71 But securing compliance from a particular regulated entity is very different from writing 
rules of general applicability, so categorizing monitoring as “ex ante” is a poor fit.  
That leaves ex post enforcement as a more natural place for monitoring in the standard ex 
ante--ex post dichotomy. But as the Supreme Court explained, “Our cases have always understood 
‘visitation’ as this right to oversee corporate affairs, quite separate from the power to enforce the 
law.”72 When in its first year the CFPB broke with tradition by sending enforcement lawyers along 
on its early regular on-site visits, called bank exams, the practice was met with “relentless opposition 
                     
69 These two categories are distinct from agencies monitoring publicly available data.  
70 See, e.g., James C. Cooper, The Costs of Regulatory Redundancy: Consumer Protection Oversight of Online Travel 
Agents and the Advantages of Sole FTC Jurisdiction, 17 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 179, 204 (2015) (describing ex ante rulemaking and 
ex post enforcement as “two tools in [agencies’] arsenals to enforce their statutory mandate”).  
71 Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Consuming Debt: Structuring the Federal Response to Abuses in Consumer Credit, 18 Loy. 
Consumer L. Rev. 43, 49 (2005).  
72 Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., 557 U.S. 519, 526 (2009). 
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from bankers.”73 The agency ultimately ended the practice, with one former CFPB official 
explaining, “The bureau learned that the nature and logistics of the two jobs are very different . . . 
.”74 
The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) recognizes regulatory monitors’ distinct 
role, classifying attorneys in the “Legal and Kindred” category. It lists the most common titles used 
for regulatory monitors elsewhere: Inspectors, Auditors, and Examiners.75 Legal scholars’ frequent 
omission of regulatory monitors reflects the common view that this group is doing something apart 
from “Legal and Kindred” actors.76 
Despite the confusion, it is important to recognize that internal agency groups can be 
distinguished by their core legal powers. Litigators hold the keys to the courts. Rule writers author 
text enacted as law. Regulatory monitors peer inside firms. 
 
B.  Defining Large Regulators 
 
While examples throughout the Article involve a variety of regulators, to manage the scope 
of the empirical analysis and investigation of statutory history, this Article focuses on “large” 
regulators of business. The OPM defines an agency as “large” if it has more than 1,000 employees.77 
To identify the set of all large regulators within this group, I located every agency in the OPM’s 
database with over 1,000 employees and a mission focused on regulating businesses.78 This includes 
both “Cabinet-Level” agencies and “Large Independent Agencies.” The nineteen agencies fitting this 
description were the CFPB, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Food Safety and 
Inspection Service (FSIS), Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration (FMCSA), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), EPA, Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Federal Reserve, Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC), and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Large regulators were chosen as the category, rather than medium or small regulators, under 
the assumption that any given large regulator is more likely to have a bigger influence on the 
                     
73 Rachel Witkowski, CFPB Pulls Enforcement Attorneys from Its Exams, Am. Banker (Oct. 9, 2013), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpb-pulls-enforcement-attorneys-from-its-exams (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review).  
74 See Witkowski, supra note 73. 
75 U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Employment Cubes, FedScope, https://www.fedscope.opm.gov/employment.asp (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter FedScope] (last visited Apr. 14, 2017).  
76 See infra section II.B. 
77 See FedScope, supra note 75. 
78 The one exception is the CFPB, which the OPM treats as a component of the Federal Reserve’s division of supervision 
and regulation, perhaps because the CFPB receives its funding from the Federal Reserve. But the Federal Reserve’s other 
functions are not listed. Thus, this Article treats the CFPB as an independent agency, and the Federal Reserve’s annual report 
was used to obtain personnel figures for its regulatory arm, which performs a similar bank-oversight function as the OCC and 
FDIC. See infra note 481 and accompanying text. 
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business world than any given small or medium regulator, due to resource allocation. That focus, 
however, inevitably leaves out important regulators. Surely some medium and smaller agencies have 
considerable influence, and by some metrics may be more influential than some large agencies. Also, 
considerable monitoring of businesses happens at the state level.79 
To differentiate business regulators from other agencies, a narrow definition was applied: the 
agency must focus on enforcing laws against businesses. If the agency focuses on overseeing 
substantial personal activities, it was eliminated. Thus, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is 
eliminated under this criterion because a substantial part of what it does is oversee individuals’ tax 
returns---even though the IRS also oversees revenue collection from businesses. Much of this 
Article’s analysis would apply to agencies that collect information from individuals. But collection of 
information from individuals carries different implications for privacy, and it is less relevant to some 
of the discussions below about market transformations and compliance departments.80  
An agency was also omitted if it did not enforce laws against businesses but instead was 
focused on some other activity. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), for instance, is 
focused on “granting U.S. patents and registering trademarks.”81 The USPTO leaves it to the patent 
and trademark holders, however, to enforce their intellectual property rights in court.82  
There is no universally accepted definition of “business regulator,” and by other defensible 
definitions of the term, the USPTO and IRS could have been included. It is worth noting that the 
USPTO and IRS would, if included, presumably strengthen at least parts of this Article’s central 
thesis, since those agencies rely heavily on employees who regularly collect information. But it 
becomes less clear how to think about the role of lawyers in an agency that does not have a strong 
law enforcement role.  
Large agencies may not, of course, be representative of agencies as a whole. It is possible 
that smaller agencies are inherently more likely to rely on enforcement lawyers than monitors, for 
instance, due to their limited resources. Further study would be needed to determine whether that is 
the case, although at least some excluded medium and small business regulators, such as offshore oil 
regulators, also rely heavily on monitoring.83 Additionally, large independent agencies collectively 
comprise ninety-three percent of all independent agency employees listed in the OPM database, 
meaning that they presumably reflect a substantial portion of the regulatory force.84 
 
                     
79 See, e.g., Sam Lewis, Insurtech: An Industry Ripe for Disruption, 1 Geo. L. Tech. R. 491, 498 (2017) (“In the United 
States, the federal government plays only a small role in the insurance regulatory system. Individual states issue most insurance 
regulations.”). 
80 See infra Part II. 
81 About Us, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, https://www.uspto.gov/about-us https://perma.cc/3JAD-76HT (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
82 See, e.g., General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-
getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents [https://perma.cc/9NNE-HGEM] (last visited Oct. 11, 2018) (“Once 
a patent is issued, the patentee must enforce the patent without aid of the USPTO.”). 
83 See infra notes 167--169 and accompanying text (discussing monitoring outside the context of large agencies). 
84 See FedScope, supra note 75 (noting that large independent agencies have 160,524 total employees, medium 
independent agencies have 11,230, and small independent agencies have 1,440). 
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C.  The Statutory Growth of Monitoring Authority 
 
The modern monitoring framework is the product of numerous ad hoc statutes that give 
different agencies various levels of visitation and reporting powers . Today’s large business 
regulators can be historically classified into one of three categories: those that had strong monitoring 
authority from the outset, those that gradually accumulated monitoring authority, and those that 
have limited monitoring power today. 
 
1. Original Monitors: Banking, Transportation, and Utilities  
 
Although historical treatments of the administrative state sometimes begin with federal 
control of the railroads of the 1880s,85 the first of today’s large business regulators was born during 
the Civil War, at a time when states implemented most inspection regimes.86 In 1864, recognizing 
that a successful military campaign required a stable financial system, President Lincoln declared that 
a “national system will create a reliable and permanent influence in support of national credit and 
protect the people against losses in the use of paper money.”87 Later that year, he signed the 
National Bank Act, creating the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).88 The OCC’s 
mission included ensuring compliance with federal banking laws, which sought to ensure a bank did 
not fail and thereby spark bank runs that could collapse the economy.89  
The OCC’s main regulatory tool was monitoring. The OCC could not litigate. Although the 
agency could write rules,90 it rarely used that authority.91 Its chief sanction was revoking a bank’s 
                     
85 See, e.g., Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Dependent Origins of Independent Agencies: The Interstate Commerce 
Commission, the Tenure of Office Act, and the Rise of Modern Campaign Finance, 31 J.L. & Pol. 139, 143--45 (2015) 
(focusing on two events for their role in reshaping the executive branch, including the establishment of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission in the 1880s); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1667, 1671 (1975) (beginning an “inquiry into the traditional model of American administrative law” by mentioning the 
regulation of railroads in the latter part of the nineteenth century). 
86 See William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America 88--89, 205--06 
(1996) (describing state laws and regulations that implemented inspection regimes before the 1880s); Ross M. Robertson, The 
Comptroller and Bank Supervision 25--26 (1995) (describing state examination of banks prior to the Civil War). Monitoring 
has long been fundamental to federal administration. Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 Stan. 
L. Rev. 443, 522--23 (2014) (noting inspections of cargo ships from the beginning of the United States); see also Robert L. 
Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189, 1197 (1986) (concluding that businesses began to be 
inspected regularly starting in the 1880s).  
87 Lincoln and the Founding of the National Banking System, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
https://www.occ.gov/about/what-we-do/history/lincoln-founding-national-banking-system.html [https://perma.cc/GGC6-
27XS] (last visited Oct. 11, 2017). 
88 National Banking Act of 1864, ch. 106, § 1, 13 Stat. 99 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2012)).  
89 Eugene N. White, Lessons from the History of Bank Examination and Supervision in the United States, 1863--2008, in 
Financial Market Regulation in the Wake of Financial Crises 15, 21 ( Alfredo Gigliobianco & Gianni Toniolo eds., 2009) 
(describing the creation and role of the OCC). 
90 See National Banking Act of 1864 §§ 22, 24, 45, 47 (granting authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe 
certain regulations); see also 12 U.S.C. § 211 (providing the modern authority for the Comptroller to promulgate regulations). 
91 See White, supra note 89, at 21. 
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national charter,92 a seldom-used option given the OCC’s need to prevent bank closings.93 OCC 
examiners still had the effect, when they appeared unannounced, of “terrorizing” lower-level bank 
cashiers.94 But as a statutory matter, the agency was built more to monitor than to litigate.  
Initially, the OCC focused on reviewing quarterly bank reports and monthly statements.95 It 
soon became clear that this enabled bankers to “window dress[]” reports.96 Congress responded by 
requiring a minimum of two surprise annual examinations of each national bank.97 The OCC already 
had the ability to conduct examinations in its originating statute.98 Former bank teller O. Henry 
depicted such an examination in one of his short stories, writing that an OCC examiner “[o]ne day . . 
. inserted an official-looking card between the bars of the cashier’s window . . . [and] [f]ive minutes 
later the bank force was dancing at the beck and call of a national bank examiner.”99 Examiners had 
the authority to enter any room, open any drawer, and look at any document.100 
Although the basic examination tool remained largely unchanged until recently,101 the 
institutional and legal framework has swelled steadily. The 1907 financial panic led Congress to 
create the Federal Reserve,102 which could conduct examinations of national banks---like the OCC---
and of state banks that chose to become “members.”103 After depositor panics sparked bank runs 
that nearly collapsed the banking system and the stock market crashed in the 1920s, more agencies 
were added, including the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to insure bank deposits104 
and the SEC “to protect . . . the national banking system” and investors.”105  
                     
92 National Banking Act of 1864 § 53 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 93). Such decisions triggered formal procedures, 
such as appeals and hearings. See id. 
93 See Eugene N. White, Lessons from American Bank Supervision from the Nineteenth Century to the Great 
Depression, in 17 Macroprudential Regulatory Policies: The New Road to Financial Stability? 41, 48 (Stijn Claessens et al. eds., 
2012). 
94 See John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before a Conference on Credit Rating and Scoring 
Models 4 (May 17, 2004), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2004/pub-speech-2004-36.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4LMQ-828Q] (“Sometimes it seemed as though terrorizing bankers was almost a requirement of the 
examiner’s job.”).  
95 See National Banking Act of 1864 § 34. 
96 See White, supra note 89, at 21. 
97 See id.  
98 National Banking Act of 1864 § 54. 
99 O. Henry, A Call Loan, in Heart of the West 240, 241 (1904); see also Hawke, supra note 94 (confirming O. Henry’s 
accounts of OCC bank examiners). 
100 White, supra note 89, at 21. 
101 See Peter Conti-Brown, The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve 165 (2016). Minor changes were made, 
such as expanding the scope of what regulators could examine to include potential future earnings, management quality, and 
the local community’s needs. See Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, 49 Stat. 684 (1935) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
102 See White, supra note 89, at 22. 
103 See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43 § 11, 38 Stat. 251, [pincite] (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 248). 
104 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). To become insured, 
banks had to accept federal examinations. Id. § 5. At first, the FDIC required approval from other banking regulators to 
examine, but in 1950 it received broader discretion to conduct examinations of its member banks. White, supra note 89, at 26. 
While only some state banks had joined the Federal Reserve, “virtually all banks” signed up for FDIC oversight, thereby greatly 
expanding monitoring’s reach. Id. 
105 Securities Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881, 881--82 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b--77s, 77ii--
77jj, 78a--78qq (2012)). The SEC had visitation comparable to that of banking regulators, but over securities exchanges, credit 
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This early visitorial authority can also be seen in the infrastructure services industries of 
transportation, energy, and telecommunications agencies. The largest modern transportation agency, 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), built an early model for its contemporary safety 
program in 1932.106 The country was divided into six “Lighthouse district areas,” within which a 
single “patrol pilot[]” would fly around, able to enter any airplane, open any airport door, or review 
any flight-related document.107 Like bank examiners, patrol pilots could sanction by recommending 
the “suspension and revocation” of licenses.108 Similarly extensive visitation can be found in the 
origins of today’s largest agencies overseeing energy and telecommunications, the Federal Regulatory 
Energy Commission (FERC)109 and Federal Communications Commission (FCC).110  
As these financial, transportation, telecommunications, and energy industries have evolved, 
monitoring statutes have mostly kept pace. Congress updated monitoring to reach new financial 
organizations, such as hedge funds, new products such as credit cards, and even a shadow banking 
                                                                  
rating organizations and securities brokers and dealers. The SEC could require “reasonable periodic, special, or other 
examinations” of “accounts, correspondence, memoranda, papers, books, and other records . . . at any time.” Id. § 13(h)(4) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m). Credit unions were also subject to federal examination. Federal Credit Union Act, Pub L. No. 
86-354, 48 Stat. 1216 (1934) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). Authority was assumed in 1970 by the National 
Credit Union Administration (NCUA). See A Brief History of Credit Unions, NCUA, 
https://www.ncua.gov/About/Pages/history.aspx [https://perma.cc/E85D-YD4Y] (last visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
106 The FAA describes this program today as its “little-seen but still important . . . flight inspection program.” Scott 
Thompson, Flight Inspection History, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/avn/flightinspection/fihistory 
[https://perma.cc/JPT4-WSLC] (last updated Aug. 6, 2014). Decades before airplanes even came into existence, Congress laid 
a foundation for the tradition of federal vehicle inspections when it authorized federal regulators to conduct inspections of 
steamboats. John G. Burke, Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power, 7 Tech. & Culture 1, 15 (1966) (discussing the law 
authorizing the appointment of steamboat-boiler inspectors in 1838). 
107 Scott A. Thompson, Flight Check!: The Story Of FAA Flight Inspection 21 (1993) (describing the origins of modern 
flight inspection programs). The modern FAA originated in the Aeronautics Branch of the Department of Commerce. Id. That 
predecessor’s authority originated in the Air Commerce Act of 1926. See Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 
Stat. 568 (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 171 (1940)). That Act gave the FAA’s predecessor the power to conduct “periodic 
examination[s] of aircraft[,] . . . airmen serving in connection with aircraft of the United States as to their qualifications[,] . . . 
[and] facilities.” Id. § 3(b)--(d). The first airworthiness inspection of an American airplane occurred within the year. See FAA, 
FAA Historical Chronology, 1926--1996, at 25, https://www.faa.gov/about/history/chronolog_history/media/b-chron.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FC2U-WNDK] (last visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
108 See Air Commerce Act § (3)(f).  
109 The predecessor of today’s largest energy regulator, FERC, was established in 1920 and began overseeing hydroelectric 
facilities. See FERC Timeline, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, https://www.ferc.gov/students/ferc/timeline.asp 
[https://perma.cc/Q6P2-ENGY] (last visited Oct. 10, 2018). The Commission’s originating statute listed, as the first of its 
general powers, the authority “to collect and record data concerning . . . the water-power industry.” Federal Power Act of 
1920, Pub. L. No. 66-280, § 4, 41 Stat. 1063, 1065 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791--828c (2012)). When Congress expanded the 
Commission’s authority in 1935 to include electricity, it also more explicitly authorized inspections of energy facilities. See 
Richard A. Rosan, On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Energy Bar Association, 17 Energy L.J. 1, 25 (1996).  
110 The FCC’s 1934 originating statute grants authority to “inspect all transmitting apparatus.” Communications Act of 
1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 303(n), 48 Stat. 1064, 1083 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2012)). The 
FCC assumed responsibilities and personnel previously of the Federal Radio Commission. See id. § 603(a). For common 
carriers, such as telephone companies, the Act provides that “[t]he Commission shall examine into transactions entered into by 
any common carrier” and “shall have access to and the right of inspection and examination of all accounts, records, and 
memoranda, including all documents, papers, and correspondence now or hereafter existing.” Id. § 215(a). This includes the 
submission of reports and inquiries into management. Id. § 218. 
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system that had by some measures become larger than the traditional banking system.111 The FAA 
today has monitoring authority over drones.112 Regulators’ initial oversight of hydroelectric dams has 
extended to other energy sources, such as nuclear power.113 The FCC, by classifying wireless phone 
companies as common carriers, broadened its visitation authority originally intended for landline 
telephone companies.114  
 
2. Gradual Monitors: Health, Safety, and the Environment  
 
Another set of agencies has gained monitoring authority more incrementally. This 
development pattern most closely fits those agencies, like environmental regulators, focused on 
protecting from physical harm. The earliest arose in pharmaceuticals. After several children died 
from tainted vaccines in 1902,115 Congress authorized federal agents to “enter and inspect any 
establishment for the propagation and preparation of any virus, serum, toxin, [or] antitoxin.”116 
                     
111 For instance, some banks reorganized themselves by forming bank holding companies and thereby shielding new lines 
of business from examinations. White, supra note 89, at 27--28. Congress responded by extending Federal Reserve 
examinations to cover bank holding companies and subsidiaries. Id. (referring to the Bank Holding Company Act 
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2012)) and Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 5(c), 70 Stat. 133, 137 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841--52)). Within 
the past few years, financial regulators also gained examination authority over hedge funds. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 404, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C. (2012)). As banks began 
to offer more products, such as credit cards, Congress enacted more laws, such as the 1968 Truth in Lending Act, thus 
widening the scope of examination. See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601--1667(f). Banking crises between the 1980s 
and 2000s forced more comprehensive disclosures in regulatory reports. See White, supra note 89, at 34. Even third-party 
service providers that banks use---such as Amazon, IBM, Google, or other technology firms---have come under monitoring 
authority. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(7), 1867(c)(1). The CFPB has gained visitorial authority over most of the shadow banking 
system. Id. §§ 5321, 5322(a)(2); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 619, 620 
(2012) (defining shadow banking and noting that it has grown larger than traditional banking). 
112 Unmanned Aircraft Joint Training and Usage Plan, Pub. L. No. 113-66, 127 Stat. 870 (2013) (“The Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall jointly 
develop and implement plans and procedures to review the potential or joint testing and evaluation of unmanned aircraft 
equipment and systems . . . .”) 
113 See Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, § 10(c), 60 Stat. 755, 768 (codified in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C. (2012)) (nuclear energy); see also 15 U.S.C. § 717g (gas); 16 U.S.C. § 825(b) (electricity); 43 U.S.C. § 1348 (2012) 
(offshore oil and gas). 
114 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). Cable 
systems also came under FCC jurisdiction. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 167--73 (1968) (finding 
that the FCC had broad authority to regulate a mobile communication form using microwaves). Deregulation in these areas has 
not removed broad authority to extract information. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation 
of Regulated Industries Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1323, 1325--26 (1998) (“The role of the agency has been transformed from 
one of protecting end-users to one of arbitrating disputes among rival providers and, in particular, overseeing access to and 
pricing of 'bottleneck' facilities that could be exploited by incumbent firms to stifle competition.”). Internet providers were also 
subject to FCC monitoring and had been classified as common carriers. See Open Internet Order, 80 Fed. Reg. 19737 (Apr. 
13, 2015). That classification was removed in December of 2017. See FCC, Restoring Internet Freedom, 
https://www.fcc.gov/restoring-internet-freedom [https://perma.cc/Z6MM-CZXM] (last visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
115 Sharon B. Jacobs, Crises, Congress, and Cognitive Biases: A Critical Examination of Food and Drug Legislation in the 
United States, 64 Food & Drug L.J. 599, 601 (2009) (“[T]he deaths of children from contaminated vaccines provided the 
impetus for the passage of the Biologics Control Act of 1902.”). 
116 Biologics Control Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-244, § 3, 32 Stat. 728, 729 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 262(c)). 
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Related visitorial statutes soon followed for meat and therapeutic drugs.117 These powers were more 
limited than those of banking and transportation regulators,118 since inspectors could not examine 
documents.119  
A shift began in 1938 when scores of people died after ingesting a new elixir used to treat 
sore throats.120 Had the company run tests, the poisonous properties would have been evident.121 
This prompted legislation requiring pharmaceutical companies to submit to the FDA information 
about drugs before any sale.122 The FDA had a sixty-day window after each submission, during 
which it could intervene.123 Examiners could also postpone the effective date of an application, 
permitting consideration for an additional 120 days.124 But the legislation did not set a minimum 
threshold for the rigor of test data, nor did it require a drug company to gain approval. Approval 
happened automatically if the FDA examiner failed to respond in time.125 Also, the amount of time 
in which the FDA could consider an application was limited.126 Thus, the laws allowed drug 
companies to engage in similar “window dressing” that plagued banks’ early reports to the OCC.127  
It was in this statutory context that Dr. Kelsey received, in her first few months on the job in 
1961, the four-volume submission for thalidomide.128 Her supervisor observed, “[T]his is a very easy 
one. There will be no problems with sleeping pills.”129 Even though Dr. Kelsey repeatedly requested 
more scientific evidence before each sixty-day window expired, the company did not have the data 
she sought, and the FDA lacked the authority to compel the production of that data.130 
Consequently, the FDA was still negotiating with the pharmaceutical company and the drug had not 
                                                                  
This function ultimately went to the FDA. See Bryan A. Liang, Regulating Follow-On Biologics, 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 363, 433 
(2007).  
117 See Meat Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 59-242, 34 Stat. 1256 (1907) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. § 601 
(2012)); Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 
Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).  
118 See supra section I.C.1. 
119 See Winton B. Rankin, Inspection Authority, 18 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 673, 673 (1963) (“[P]resent law and facilities 
only permit occasional spot checks through factory inspection . . . .”). 
120 David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its Substantive Provisions, 6 
Law & Contemp. Probs. 2, 20 (1939) (“At least 73, perhaps over 90, persons in various parts of the country . . . died as a result 
of taking a drug known as ‘Elixir Sulfanilamide’ . . . .”). 
121 See id. (“Tests on animals or even an investigation of the published literature would have revealed the lethal character 
of the solvent.”).  
122 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C. (2012)). 
123 Id. § 505(c). 
124 Id.; see also Kelsey, supra note 56, at 51, 55 (explaining what happened when the FDA found that the new drug 
application was incomplete).   
125 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505(c). 
126 Id.  
127 See supra section I.C.1. 
128 See Kelsey, supra note 56, at 48--49. 
129 Id. at 49. 
130 See James L. Zelenay, Jr., The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster Food and Drug Administration Always a 
Better Food and Drug Administration?, 60 Food & Drug L.J. 261, 264--66 (2005) (noting that although examiners had the 
authority to reject a new drug application as unsafe, the FDA likely did not have the authority to delay an application on the 
basis of “insufficient information”). 
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been approved when reports of widespread birth defects emerged from Germany, which had 
approved the drug years earlier.131  
Fueled by public alarm that the United States had barely avoided tragedy,132 President 
Kennedy signed a law requiring pharmaceutical companies to submit heightened scientific evidence-
--a precursor to the FDA’s modern clinical trials.133 Even without evidence that the drug would be 
unsafe, starting in the 1960s FDA officials could withhold drug approval134 and “inspect records, 
files, papers, processes, controls and facilities” of pharmaceutical companies.135 In 2011, after deaths 
and illnesses from tainted peanut butter, cookies, and ice cream products,136 Congress gave the FDA 
broad food-inspection powers, matching those the agency had received for drugs.137  
The thalidomide incident marked the beginning of a period of rapid growth in health 
monitoring. Amidst worsening air quality and related health concerns,138 the federal government 
launched the EPA in 1970.139 The agency has regularly received new visitation authority over private 
companies in a range of sectors.140 In the same year as the EPA launched, Congress created the 
                     
131 See Kelsey, supra note 56, at 65--67; see also Peltzman, supra note 64, at 1050--51 (discussing the thalidomide crisis as 
the catalyst for increased FDA monitoring of new drugs entering the market). 
132 Jacobs, supra note 115, at 609--12 (discussing coverage of thalidomide that emphasized the episode as a potential 
“national tragedy [that] had been averted thanks only to the ‘skeptical FDA physician’”)). 
133 See Kefauver Harris Amendment, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962). Drug companies were also required to 
submit any reports of adverse effects, which they previously could have withheld. See Zelenay, supra note 56, at 266 
(summarizing the increased reporting requirements included in the 1962 act). 
134 Compare Kefauver Harris Amendment § 102 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)) (listing grounds for “refusing 
to approve the application” that do not address safety concerns, including that there is “a lack of substantial evidence that the 
drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have”), with 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1958) (listing only safety concerns as 
grounds for “refusing to permit the [drug] application to become effective”). See also Zelenay, supra note 130, at 265 & n.31 
(noting that rejecting the thalidomide application in 1961 for “insufficient information” may not have been within the FDA’s 
statutory mandate). 
135 See Rankin, supra note 119, at 673. 
136 Recent Legislation, Food Safety Modernization Act Implements Private Regulatory Scheme, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 859, 
859--60 (2012) (linking several high-profile deaths from salmonella to the Food Safety Modernization Act). 
137 See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 
7, 21, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)). Most notably among business records, facilities must maintain food safety plans. See 21 U.S.C. § 
350c(a)(2) (2012). Federal onsite food and drug surveillance programs today reach manufacturers, distribution warehouses, 
grocery stores, and restaurants. See id. 
138 Despite a broader mission, the EPA’s origins lie in health-related incidents. See William S. Eubanks II, The Clean Air 
Act’s New Source Review Program: Beneficial to Public Health or Merely a Smoke-and-Mirrors Scheme?, 29 J. Land 
Resources & Envtl. L. 361, 362 (2009) (discussing early air-pollution-control legislation, which resulted from thousands of 
sicknesses and deaths caused by smog).  
139 See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 199 (1970), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. app. at l698—703 
(2012). The Agency assumed duties from several preexisting agencies. See The Origins of EPA, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/history/origins-epa [https://perma.cc/D3LB-LHHE] (last visited Oct. 11, 2018).  
140 See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2012) (selling or distributing pesticides); 
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012) (toxic substances); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 
1254 (2012) (transporting oil); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f (drinking water suppliers); Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6927 (hazardous wastes); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (general pollutants). For a more detailed summary of these various inspection 
provisions, see James A. Holtkamp & Linda W. Magleby, The Scope of EPA’s Inspection Authority, Nat. Resources & Env’t., 
Fall 1990, at 16, 16--17. This authority covers organizational processes; remotely installed monitoring devices; and entrance 
onto private property to examine records, take samples, and inspect facilities. See id. (describing the monitoring authority 
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Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),141 whose originating statute empowered it 
to enter workplaces to conduct inspections, examine documents, and question employees.142  
Whereas prior federal visitorial powers targeted specific industries---drugs, food, banking, 
mining,143 or transportation---the EPA and OSHA obtained cross-industry reach, enabling the 
federal government to look inside almost every private business across the country. In 1978, in 
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., the Supreme Court found a Fourth Amendment administrative search 
warrant requirement for industries without “a long tradition of close government supervision.”144 
But this ruling has left many domains subject to warrantless monitoring searches.145 Moreover, 
inspectors in other industries regularly give a Miranda-style146 warning that the employer has the right 
to request a warrant, which businesses rarely exercise.147 Thus, despite some obstacles along the way, 
the largest federal health, safety, and environmental regulators incrementally over the past century 
obtained the type of visitorial tools that the OCC received for banks during the Civil War.148 
 
3. Limited Monitors: Trade and Labor  
 
Regulators focused on protecting individuals from economic harms have more limited 
monitoring authority.149 Spurred by Ida Tarbell’s popular writings about the “autocratic powers in 
                                                                  
granted to the EPA by these acts). Congress also requires firms to notify the EPA of the development of new chemicals. See 
15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (giving the EPA ninety days to write a rule following notice). 
141 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended in scattered titles 
of the U.S.C.).  
142 See 29 U.S.C. § 657(a)--(c) (2012). 
143 The federal government first gained inspection authority over mines in 1941, through the Department of the Interior. 
See Act of May 7, 1941, ch. 87, 55 Stat. 177 (repealed 1969). Inspections for noncoal mines came in the 1960s. See Act of Sept. 
26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-300, 75 Stat. 649 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1457 (2012)). That authority was later transferred to the 
Department of Labor, see Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, § 301, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290, 1317--19 
(codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 961 (2012)), through the newly created Mine Safety and Health Administration in 1977, see 
id. § 302(a) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 557a). 
144 436 U.S. 307, 313, 320--21 (1978). The EPA is held to similar standards. See National-Standard Co. v. Adamkus, 881 
F.2d 352, 361 (7th Cir. 1989). In industries with a history of close regulatory oversight, an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s search warrant requirement is appropriate. See Marshall, 436 U.S. at 313--14. 
145 Marshall does not prevent warrantless administrative searches in various heavily regulated industries. See, e.g., Dow 
Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (allowing the EPA to conduct warrantless aerial surveillance of private 
property); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 605--06 (1982) (allowing the Department of Labor to conduct warrantless 
searches to inspect worker health and safety in the mining industry); United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 651 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(holding that the OCC can conduct warrantless searches of bank documents). 
146 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467--68 (1966) (establishing the duty of officers to inform those in custody of 
their right to remain silent). 
147 Interview with OSHA Deputy Regional Administrator and Regional Administrator (Apr. 7, 2017) [hereinafter 
Interview with OSHA]. Despite the significance of a constitutional protection, Marshall’s practical impact is limited. The Court 
acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment was less relevant to OSHA than to criminal searches. See Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320. 
Unlike police officers, OSHA would not need “probable cause . . . based . . . on specific evidence of an existing violation.” Id. 
The agency could instead obtain a warrant if the search was part of a “general administrative plan.” See id. at 320--21. This 
ruling forced OSHA to develop national inspection plans. Interview with OSHA, supra. If needed, an OSHA inspector can 
easily obtain a warrant without probable cause by showing the magistrate judge its plan. Id. 
148 See supra section I.B.1.  
149 In contrast to the agencies discussed in this section, the SEC protects investors, who are often institutional. Also, the 
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commerce” of John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company,150 and the activism of President 
Theodore Roosevelt,151 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was founded in 1914.152 Its two main 
missions are to protect consumers and to promote competition. The FTC had from the outset the 
power “[t]o require . . . corporations engaged in commerce . . . to file with the commission . . . both 
annual and special[] reports or answers in writing to specific questions . . . as to the organization, 
business, conduct, practices, [and] management.”153 President Roosevelt had unsuccessfully 
advocated for a stronger monitoring framework: mandatory notifications prior to mergers and 
acquisitions.154 In 1976, Congress extended that authority.155 Despite its extensive report-collecting 
tools, the agency has never had explicit visitation authority for either competition or consumer 
protection.  
The two leading regulators of employment have even more limited monitoring authority 
than the FTC. Amidst the labor unrest of the Great Depression, Congress tasked the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) with the “protection by law of the right of employees to organize 
and bargain collectively.”156 The NLRB’s originating statute did not mention monitoring in the 
traditional sense. The agency perhaps comes closest to monitoring today through its on-site 
supervision of union elections.157 
In the face of nationwide protests and unrest, the 1964 Civil Rights Act established the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and required companies to maintain 
                                                                  
agency was formed as part of a broader goal of protecting the financial system rather than individuals. See supra note 105 and 
accompanying text. 
150 2 Ida M. Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company 229 (reprint 1963) (Macmillan, two vols. in one 1933) (1904); 
see also 1 Tarbell, supra, at 158 (concluding that Standard Oil had “great power . . . resistless, silent, perfect in its might”). 
Tarbell’s writings would ultimately contribute to the breakup of Standard Oil. See Steve Weinberg, Taking on the Trust: The 
Epic Battle of Ida Tarbell and John D. Rockefeller 246--51 (2008). 
151 See F.M. Scherer, Sunlight and Sunset at the Federal Trade Commission, 42 Admin. L. Rev. 461, 462 (1990) (noting 
President Roosevelt’s role in providing the impetus for the founding of the Bureau of Corporations, the predecessor of the 
FTC). 
152 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 6, 38 Stat. 717, 721–-22 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).. 
153 Id. § 6(b). 
154 See Scherer, supra note 151, at 462--63 (discussing the monitoring framework that Roosevelt advocated for in a 1900 
letter to the New York legislature). 
155 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 201, 90 Stat. 1383, 1390--94 (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 18a). In 2003, Congress added further mandatory notifications of contractual agreements between brand-name 
and generic drug companies. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
173, § 1112, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461--63 (codified as amended at sections of 21 U.S.C. § 355 note (2012)).  
156 National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151--169 
(2012)). 
157 See ABA, Representation Law and Procedures 17, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/basics_papers/nlra/representation_procedures.authcheck
dam.pdf [https://perma.cc/82NG-3S29] (last visited Oct. 11, 2018) (noting that elections are supervised by an NLRB agent on 
the employer’s premises). Since the NLRB’s main role is to conduct the elections, such as by overseeing the agreement as to 
time, place, and methods for voting, the main purpose is not as clearly to collect nonpublic information as to manage an event. 
See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., Conduct Elections, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/conduct-elections (last visited Dec. 14, 
2018).  
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employment records.158 The original House bill for the agency had put forth an information 
collection authority modeled after the FTC, but that language was removed in the face of intense 
Senate opposition.159 The final legislation specified that to collect records the EEOC must write 
rules.160 In both the EEOC and NLRB, “examination” occurs mostly after a firm is accused.161 But 
the EEOC has used its original statutory authority to write rules to require businesses to submit to 
the EEOC confidential employee data broken down by race, gender, and other categories.162 
As yet, no crisis or national outcry has driven Congress to give explicit visitorial authority to 
these three agencies. But the creation of the CFPB in 2011 represented a break with the traditional 
absence of visitorial authority for regulators focused on protecting against economic harms to 
individuals.163 The FTC had previously exercised consumer protection authority for many financial 
institutions implicated in the subprime mortgage crisis, such as nonbank mortgage servicers.164 
Congress moved most of that authority to the CFPB after millions of families lost their homes to 
foreclosure, many due to unscrupulous lending.165 Unlike the FTC, the CFPB was given broad 
visitorial authority to regularly appear on-site.166 Thus, despite remaining more limited than other 
spheres, the largest regulators of individual economic rights can monitor to some extent. 
Additionally, between the launch of the CFPB and the increase in FTC antitrust reporting, the 
overall trajectory of this sphere of regulation has been toward more statutory monitoring authority.  
 
D.  Summary of the Statutory Rise 
 
Across diverse industries and under both Democratic and Republican party leadership, 
Congress has since the mid-1800s steadily expanded federal agencies’ ability to monitor private 
                     
158 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(a), 2000e-8(c) (2012).  
159 See Michael Z. Green, Proposing a New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement After 35 Years: Outsourcing Charge 
Processing by Mandatory Mediation, 105 Dick. L. Rev. 305, 320 (2001) (describing the much stronger authority for the EEOC 
envisioned in the committee version of the bills and the opposition that limited the agency’s authority). 
160 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) (requiring employers to “make and keep such records” relevant to determining whether 
unlawful employment practices occurred but requiring employers to make reports only “as the Commission shall prescribe by 
regulation or order”). 
161 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 §§ 709--710, 78 Stat. 241, 262--64 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e-8--2000e-9); National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 11, 49 Stat. 449, 455--56 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151--169 (2012)); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 64 (1984) (“[EEOC’s] power to conduct an 
investigation can be exercised only after a specific charge has been filed in writing.” (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 7214 (1964))). 
162 See 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (2012) (requiring companies to file an EEO-1 report annually); EEO-1 Frequently Asked 
Questions and Answers, U.S. EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey/faq.cfm [https://perma.cc/L62D-P6LX] 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2018) (noting that the survey “requires company employment data to be categorized by race/ethnicity, 
gender and job category”). 
163 Banking regulators had a secondary mission of consumer protection, but their main mission was rooted in stability 
concerns. See supra Part I.C.1. 
164 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321, 5322(a)(2), 5491(a) (2012). 
165 Laura Kusisto, Many Who Lost Homes to Foreclosure in Last Decade Won’t Return---NAR, Wall St. J. (Apr. 20, 
2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/many-who-lost-homes-to-foreclosure-in-last-decade-wont-return-nar-1429548640 (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (“More than 9.3 million homeowners went through a foreclosure, surrendered their home to 
a lender or sold their home via a distress sale between 2006 and 2014.”).  
166 12 U.S.C. § 5514(b)(1) (noting that the “Bureau shall require reports and conduct examinations on a periodic basis”).  
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firms. This historical accumulation of federal authority spans other areas not covered above because 
small and medium regulators govern them, including offshore oil drilling,167 liquor stores,168 and 
firearm manufacturers.169 Overall, among the nineteen large federal regulators,170 only the NLRB is 
without substantial monitoring authority. Two others, the FTC and the EEOC, have the meaningful 
ability to collect records, but not to conduct on-site inspections. Sixteen of the nineteen largest 
agencies have both strong visitorial monitoring and record collection authority.171 The laws are in 
place for a formidable regulatory-monitor state. 
 
II. The Institutional Rise 
 
Agency behavior is determined not just by its underlying statutes but also by stakeholders. 
Scholars have focused on the changing influence of external stakeholders such as Congress, the 
President, and special interest groups on the administrative state.172 Internal agency groups also 
compete for control, but their history has been largely studied through the lens of policy 
instruments.173 A standard account holds that adjudication dominated agency policymaking until the 
1970s, when agencies entered “an age of rulemaking.”174 The internal narrative then becomes vague, 
despite general recognition that in the 1990s and 2000s new governance models took hold.175 Some 
observers believe that rulemaking still remains the dominant policy instrument,176 while others see a 
shift to either “policy through litigation, negotiated settlements, or the waiver of rules in individual 
contexts.”177  
                     
167 See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 43 U.S.C. § 1348 (2012) (providing authority for the 
inspection and investigation of offshore oil-drilling platforms). 
168 See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76 (1970) (“Congress has broad power to design such 
powers of inspection under the liquor laws as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand.”). 
169 See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316--17 (1972) (concluding that “inspections for compliance with the Gun 
Control Act pose only limited threats to . . . privacy” and when “regulatory inspections further urgent federal interest, and the 
possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy are” minimal, “the inspection may proceed without a warrant where specifically 
authorized by statute”). 
170 See supra section I.B (listing the nineteen large regulators and describing the methodology for identifying them).  
171 See infra Appendix A; supra section I.B. 
172 See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 54, at 2253 (arguing that President Clinton ushered in an era of “presidential 
administration,” but noting that “[a]t the dawn of the regulatory state, Congress controlled administrative action”).  
173 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 1375, 1407--08 
(2017) (presenting a typology of inter- and intra-agency conflict, noting that agency conflicts “manifest in all forms of decision 
making: rulemaking, adjudication, and program-level policy,” and acknowledging that the scholarship focuses on rulemaking). 
174 See J. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 375, 
375--76 (1974); see also M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1383, 1384--86 (2004) 
(noting the “detectable shift” toward rulemaking in the 1970s). 
175 See infra section II.A. 
176 See, e.g., Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1992, 
2017 (2012) (“[S]ince the 1970s, informal rulemaking has been the preferred means of implementing agency policy . . . .”). 
177 See Magill, supra note 174, at 1398--99. Professors Magill and Vermeule identify various factors that reallocate power 
toward and away from lawyers, without distinguishing regulatory monitors or seeing an overall trend. See Magill & Vermeule, 
supra note 38, at 1077. 
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This Part adds an unexamined dimension to that internal organization narrative by filling out 
the role of the monitoring group.178 It shows how prominent changes in governance and markets 
have plausibly moved regulators to rely more on monitors than on other groups. The governance 
changes include greater weight on collaborating with businesses, the rise of compliance departments 
in corporations, and increased external stakeholder pressure. The market changes include the greater 
sophistication of modern businesses, the pace of innovation, and the ubiquity of information 
technologies. Although the focus is on recent historical shifts, the main goal is to lay the foundations 
for understanding the role of regulatory monitors today.  
 
A.  Governance Changes Favoring Regulatory Monitors 
 
Over the past thirty years, agencies have adopted new approaches to governing firms. 
Prominent observers attribute the change to a “crisis in confidence”179 in regulation, or the 
perception that in “the administrative state . . . much is terribly wrong.”180 Regardless of its origins, 
three main features of new governance make regulatory monitors more internally important: 
emphasis on collaboration between regulators and regulated entities, reliance on business self-
regulation, and oversight of agencies by external stakeholders.  
 
1. Collaborative Governance 
 
 One major shift in the modern regulatory approach is a greater emphasis on 
collaboration.181 The U.S. House Budget Committee displayed this philosophy in OSHA’s 2017 
budget hearing, encouraging the agency to minimize punishment and instead “partner with 
businesses to create safer workplaces.”182 The extent to which any given agency has adopted this 
model varies, but one of its features is seeing rules as provisional, requiring the parties to flexibly 
“devise solutions to regulatory problems.”183  
The emphasis on partnership is important, in part, for the acquisition of information. 
Agencies today generally believe rules should be “responsive to[] the particular contexts in which 
they are deployed” by relying on “feedback mechanisms” that are “continuous.”184 Firms that are 
                     
178 At the core of existing internal narratives is a recognition that organizational dynamics of administrative agencies have 
shifted in response to new governance paradigms and market evolutions, but how those dynamics intersect with regulatory 
monitors has yet to be explored. 
179 Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 30, at 158. 
180 See Freeman, supra note 30, at 8--9 (discussing widespread critiques of ossified regulation). 
181 See id. at 4, 22 (identifying an emerging “model of collaborative governance”); see also Lobel, supra note 30 at 344. 
182 OSHA, FY 2017 Congressional Budget Justification 14--16, 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/documents/general/budget/CBJ-2017-V2-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3HL-NU4F] 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2018). 
183 Freeman, supra note 30, at 22. This depiction intersects with elements of Professors Ayres and Braithwaite’s 
“responsive regulation.” See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 30, at 35--36 (presenting a generic “enforcement pyramid” 
demonstrating that agencies seek regulatory compliance more frequently through efforts at “persuasion” than the use of civil 
or criminal penalties or license revocations); see also infra notes 295--299 and accompanying text.  
184 Freeman, supra note 30, at 22, 28. 
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less afraid of punishment, it is thought, become more willing to share information. For instance, the 
EPA’s new cooperative model gave it “open access” to citrus-juice plants, whereas in the prior 
relationship “companies resist[ed] inspection and cooperate[d] with the EPA only grudgingly.”185 
The cooperative model aims to free the parties to focus their energies on fixing mistakes and 
identifying causes instead of fighting over whether anything was wrong.  
Litigation groups are seen as less well-suited to this model. Legal investigations cause 
information exchange to become “bogged down as target firms resist[] compliance and pursue[] 
blocking actions in the courts.”186 Consider, again, the example of how the CFPB in its early 
financial examinations brought along enforcement lawyers.187 Industry groups had criticized the 
practice, saying that “the presence of enforcement attorneys at routine examinations created a 
hostile regulatory environment.”188 The CFPB’s Ombudsman had studied the matter and warned 
that the presence of attorneys would serve as “a barrier to a free exchange.”189 Asked to explain its 
subsequent termination of the policy, the CFPB said that it “wasn’t efficient.”190  
A collaborative relationship with continuous information flow would naturally propel an 
agency to become more dependent on regulatory monitors. Although some regulatory monitors 
have been viewed as critical and overbearing,191 their information collection does not assume the 
regulated entity has misbehaved. Indeed, the scholarly depiction of the collaborative model of 
governance matches some historical descriptions of early bank examiners, who because of limited 
sanction authority “recommended”192 rather than commanded, and relied on “cooperation” to 
achieve compliance.193 Banking regulators have remained “famously nonadversarial,”194 and energy 
inspectors have retained a team-oriented approach.195 An agency adopting collaborative governance 
might thus seek to shift more interactions from regulatory lawyers to regulatory monitors.  
 
2. Compliance Departments and Self-Regulation  
 
                     
185 Id. at 61. 
186 Scherer, supra note 151, at 471 (observing dynamics in the 1970s, from the perspective of having been an FTC 
economist). 
187 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
188 Alan Zibel, Consumer Regulator to Stop Bringing Lawyers to Firm Exams, Wall St. J. (Oct. 9, 2013), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/consumer-regulator-to-stop-bringing-lawyers-to-firm-exams-1381357959?tesla=y (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). 
189 CFPB Ombudsman’s Office, FY2012 Annual Report to the Director 13 (2012), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201211_Ombuds_Office_Annual_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/545Y-CY7X]. 
190 Witkowski, supra note 73. 
191 See Hawke, supra note 94, at 4. 
192 See White, supra note 89, at 21; White, supra note 93, at 48. 
193 See Robertson, supra note 86, at 71.  
194 David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 187, 208 (2010). 
195 See Hayes, supra note 11 (describing how energy inspectors “work alongside, not against, industry to ensure operators 
follow acceptable industry practices and federal safety standards”). 
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 Many regulators now emphasize “management-based regulation.”196 Fiscal constraints 
simply make it impossible to monitor all private actions even for the most dangerous activities: 
Federal inspectors estimate that only one to two percent of all “safety related” nuclear plant 
activities are subject to close, annual government monitoring.197 Self-regulation does not necessarily 
mean an absence of oversight, but “that regulation should respond to . . . how effectively industry is 
making private regulation work.”198 This self-regulatory model encourages regulatory 
experimentalism.199 Instead of a bottom-up approach of examining every product, document, or 
facility for strict adherence to a code, the agency “intervene[s] at the planning stage, compelling 
regulated organizations to improve their internal management so as to increase the achievement of 
public goals.”200 In essence, the regulator engages in a top-down assessment of a firm’s self-
monitoring.  
The need for self-monitoring helps explain why “the compliance department has emerged, in 
many firms, as the co-equal of the legal department.”201 When the legal department runs a 
company’s compliance, the concern is that the process may become “excessively legalistic.”202 
Compliance departments review employees’ practices or consumer complaints not only to ensure 
that the company is not breaking the letter of the law as determined by the legal department, but in 
many cases to tell the company how to “comply with the spirit of the law.”203 The compliance 
department keeps internal records of violations and the firm’s responses204---records that regulatory 
monitors can later examine.  
EPA rules, for example, require companies producing hazardous chemicals to build a risk 
management plan205 and perform inspections of their equipment.206 Companies must regularly 
submit the documentation to authorities, listing all incidents that have occurred.207 Environmental 
agencies then audit those internal reports,208 which may result in a “determination of necessary 
                     
196 See generally Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to 
Achieve Public Goals, 37 Law & Soc’y Rev. 691 (2003) (using case studies to illustrate when and how management-based 
regulation can be effective). 
197 Peter K. Manning, The Limits of Knowledge, in Making Regulatory Policy 49, 70 (Keith Hawkins & John Thomas eds., 
1989).  
198 See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 30, at 4. 
199 Cf. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 373--
80 (1998) (describing “emergent experimentalism” in the environmental-regulation context). 
200 Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 196, at 694. 
201 Griffith, supra note 27, at 2077. 
202 Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate Counsel in an Era of Compliance, 53 Am. Bus. L.J. 
203, 206 (2016). 
203 See Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why Departmentalization May Not Be the Answer, 10 
Hastings Bus. L.J. 71, 149 (2014) (quoting from the author’s interview with an anonymous chief compliance officer in the 
financial industry). 
204 See generally id. at 91--97 (describing the function of the compliance department). 
205 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b)--(c) (2018) (requiring companies to develop and train employees concerning “procedures to 
maintain the on-going integrity of process equipment”). 
206 See id. § 68.73(d). 
207 See id. § 68.220(a)--(b). 
208 Id. § 68.220(a). 
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revisions” to the company’s systems.209 Agencies also enlist a growing number of private third-party 
monitors to assess compliance.210  
Depending on how it is implemented, self-regulation can diminish the role of regulatory 
monitors relative to other agency groups because it privatizes core monitoring tasks.211 This is 
particularly true when the agency delegates all monitoring to third parties.212 But replacement is not 
how most agencies have approached self-regulation. Many still conduct their own inspections, 
alongside industry self-monitoring.213 Rather, the model transforms the agency into a manager of 
private monitors.  
From an internal perspective, agencies’ regulatory monitors---not their litigators---normally 
assume this managerial role.214 Thus, this managerial model moves regulatory monitors from 
examining the details of paperwork or safety valves to making sure others do those jobs. In some 
sense, this amounts to promoting regulatory monitors to a more senior supervisory role. As 
supervisors of large business departments rather than individual documents or equipment, regulatory 
monitors can collect more information in the same amount of time, because the company’s 
compliance employees create a data report that the regulatory monitors would have previously 
compiled.  
Moreover, the compliance department is prominent inside large businesses, with the Chief 
Compliance Officer typically reporting to the CEO and often the board.215 Consequently, any 
                     
209 Id. § 68.220(e). 
210 See Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, The Integrity of Private Third-Party Compliance Monitoring, Admin. & Reg. L. 
News, Fall 2016, at 22, 22 (noting that third-party certification is used in “a wide array of domains, including food safety, 
pollution control, product safety, medical devices, and financial accounting”); see also Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The 
Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 53, 93--94 (1986) (giving examples of industries in which 
liability is imposed upon third-party monitors like the underwriters of securities to incentivize thorough and accurate 
gatekeeping in order to prevent fraudulent products from reaching the market). See generally Kraakman, supra, at 56--60 
(outlining the benefits of relying on third-party monitors and noting that “[i]n general, third-party strategies can exploit private 
enforcement information ex ante . . . by disclosing it to enforcement officials or potential victims or by relying on private 
monitors themselves to take obstructive action short of direct disclosure”). The SEC uses a related model by overseeing a 
private regulator, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which performs examinations and has its own 
enforcement group. See Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., FINRA 2015 Year in Review and Annual Financial Report 12--13 
(2016), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2015_YIR_AFR.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V76-GV88]. 
211 See Ryan Beene, Is NHTSA Nominee Up to Task?, Tire Bus. (Dec. 1, 2014), 
http://www.tirebusiness.com/article/20141201/NEWS/141209995/is-nhtsa-nominee-up-to-task [https://perma.cc/KCS2-
PSC8] (describing how “NHTSA allocates just $10 million a year to its roughly 50 staffers,” while GM alone hired 35 safety 
investigators in a single year).  
212 Third-party private auditing has grown in recent years. See Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party 
Verification, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2012). Private parties also often serve as monitors after courts determine wrongdoing. See 
Root, supra note 10, at 527. 
213 See supra notes 205--209 and accompanying text for an example of how the EPA imposes self-monitoring obligations 
in addition to conducting its own inspections.  
214 See, e.g., SEC, Agency Financial Report Fiscal Year 2016, at 9 (2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8PU-TBW2] (noting that the monitors in the Office 
of Compliance Inspections conducts the examinations of private monitors, as distinct from the litigators in the Enforcement 
division and the Office of General Counsel). An agency group that is already the most knowledgeable about monitoring 
activities would be the natural home for such managing of private monitors. 
215 See Griffith, supra note 27, at 2077. 
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regulatory-monitor recommendation for improving a firm’s compliance system can affect a broader 
portion of the business on a more enduring basis. Imagine, for instance, that a credit-card company 
has been found to have illegally charged consumers fees. In a precompliance world, the regulator 
might rely on a legal settlement or court order requiring the company to stop charging that fee 
moving forward. In the era of compliance management, the regulator (today, the CFPB) can bypass 
the courts and simply ask the company to develop a system for internally reviewing customer 
complaints for legal violations. That internal change means that the compliance department moving 
forward will catch not only this particular illegal credit card fee but also other improper fees that 
might arise in the future. Furthermore, the CFPB examination group regularly checks to make sure 
financial institutions have such customer complaint monitoring systems in place, even without any 
evidence that the firm has done anything wrong.216  
In other words, the firm’s compliance team essentially serves as the regulatory monitors’ 
agents. Scholars have more broadly recognized that the compliance “revolution” in corporate 
governance means that “prosecutors can externalize a portion of their budget.”217 While that may be 
true, in terms of internal organizational dynamics, agencies would be expected to shift some of what 
was previously prosecutors’ domain---promoting compliance through litigation---to regulatory 
monitors. 
The move to compliance management may also reallocate responsibilities between regulatory 
monitors and rule makers. Compliance management reflects how “[b]est practices are the new 
means through which Congress and federal agencies are making administrative law.”218 In the Clean 
Water Act, Congress mandated that states and the EPA identify “best management practices” for 
tackling the biggest source of water pollution: runoff from cities and farms.219 The EPA then shares 
“success stories” that can be adopted elsewhere.220 In a world of formal rules that must be strictly 
applied, the rulemaking group spells out the particular steps a firm must take to comply with the law. 
Conversely, in a world of best practices, there are often multiple ways to satisfy the mandate. A best 
practices regime thereby allows agency regulatory monitors not only to identify the best practices in 
the first place, but also to assess whether a given firm’s practices come close enough to “best.”  
 
3. Heightened Stakeholder Oversight  
 
Agencies have come under increasing scrutiny from Congress,221 the President,222 and 
courts.223 This oversight may drive agencies toward greater reliance on regulatory monitors for three 
                     
216 Interview with Former CFPB employee (Mar. 10, 2017) [hereinafter CFPB Interview]. 
217 See Griffith, supra note 27, at 2077, 2127.  
218 David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 294, 296 (2006). 
219 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)(C) (2012); see also Zaring, supra note 218, at 326, 329. 
220 See Zaring, supra note 218, at 331. 
221 See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 573, 606-
-07 (2008) (“Congress uses a range of instruments to influence administrative agencies, including restrictions on the 
appointment and removal of personnel, specification of substantive or procedural restrictions, appropriations, oversight 
hearings, and deadlines.”). 
222 See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 54, at 2281--318 (discussing President Clinton’s role in shaping the regulatory activity of 
the executive branch agencies).  
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main reasons. First, as a general matter, “[a]dministrative agencies, like trial judges facing appellate 
review, dislike having their decisions reversed.”224 To avoid wasted efforts and delays, agencies 
insulate themselves from oversight.225 They have substituted policy statements and interpretative 
guidelines for official rules to avoid having to go through notice and comment.226 For enforcement, 
agencies have turned to extrajudicial strategies such as settlements and recommendations.227 As the 
FDA explains of a regulatory-monitor tool it has used increasingly in recent years, a “Warning Letter 
is informal and advisory. . . . FDA does not consider Warning Letters to be final agency action on 
which it can be sued.”228 Courts have agreed.229 
The same rulemaking and litigation groups could control informal activities. However, 
informal tools move further from the distinct functions and skillsets of legal actors, opening the 
door for other groups to assume related responsibilities. Moreover, court oversight has restricted 
even rule makers’ informal alternatives. After industry complaints that the FDA was using “Good 
Guidance Practices”230 to write de facto rules, Congress required the agency to solicit public notice 
and comment prior to issuing major guidelines.231 However, those constraints did not address 
regulatory monitors’ main textual outlets, such as their industry-wide inspection manuals and case-
by-case recommendations.232  
Second, rulemaking has slowed considerably. Under the recent Bush and Clinton 
administrations, on average, over eight hundred days passed between a rule’s agenda publication and 
final adoption.233 When rules are not updated, frontline regulatory monitors or their supervisors 
must interpret old laws to apply them to new practices. If agencies are largely unable to write formal 
                                                                  
223 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Inside the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration: Legal 
Determinants of Bureaucratic Organization and Performance, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 443, 444 (1990) (“Indeed, courts frustrated by 
the ineffectiveness of legal directives often try their own hand at reorienting agencies’ internal laws, cultures, and personnel.”). 
224 Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1755, 1756 (2013). 
225 See id. at 1782--1813 (describing how agencies choose from various regulatory instruments to self-insulate from 
presidential review). 
226 Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385, 1393 (1992) 
(observing the “increasing tendency of agencies to engage in ‘nonrule rulemaking’”); Zaring, supra note 218, at 297 fig.2 
(showing a significant and steady increase in the annual number of regulations referencing “best practices” in the Federal 
Register from 1980 to 2004).  
227 Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 176, at 2034 (“Agencies . . . have, with modest success, adopted informal 
techniques in response to system-wide disputes that otherwise would overtax traditional, individualized adjudication.”).  
228 See FDA, Regulatory Procedures Manual ch.4, at 4 (2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/UCM074330.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AL93-J6V4]. 
229 See Holistic Candlers and Consumers Ass’n v. FDA, 664 F.3d 940, 944 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“The letters plainly do not 
mark the consummation of FDA’s decisionmaking.”). 
230 The Food and Drug Administration’s Development, Issuance, and Use of Guidance Documents, 62 Fed. Reg. 8961, 
8967--68 (Feb. 27, 1997) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §10.115 (2018)). 
231 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 405, 111 Stat. 2296, 2368 (1997) (codified 
at 21 U.S.C. § 371(h)(1)(A) (2012)) (“The Secretary shall develop guidance documents with public participation . . . .”); see also 
Lars Noah, Governance by the Backdoor: Administrative Law(lessness?) at the FDA, 93 Neb. L. Rev. 89, 98--99 (2014) 
(describing Congress’s requirements that the FDA “solicit comments before finalizing major guidance”).  
232 See infra section III.C. 
233 Stuart Shapiro, Presidents and Process: A Comparison of the Regulatory Process Under the Clinton and Bush (43) 
Administrations, 23 J.L. & Pol. 393, 416 (2007). 
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rules, and instead engage in soft rulemaking, agencies may be incentivized to write vaguer rules that 
are nonbinding.234 Imprecise rules may force agencies to rely more on frontline actors’ persuasion 
and judgment. Instead of following a lawyer’s written instructions (the legal rule), regulatory 
monitors in such agencies can act more like clients, consulting lawyers only as needed with help in 
interpretation.235  
Third, one of the impulses behind greater external oversight is to “ensure[] that regulatory 
agencies exercise their policymaking discretion in a manner that is reasoned.”236 Most prominently, 
courts and the President have imposed cost-benefit analyses,237 and “lawyers will have little to 
contribute to this quintessentially technocratic problem.”238 Additionally, the Paperwork Reduction 
Act (PRA) constrains rule writers’ ability to collect supportive information from firms.239  
In contrast to these legal constraints on lawyers’ core activities, in recent years Congress has 
imposed widespread monitoring minimums, such as annual or more frequent on-site examinations of 
credit rating organizations,240 food manufacturers,241 and oil producers.242 To be sure, statutes in 
some contexts require regular actions by rule writers and litigators if an agency chooses to act. For 
the EPA to ban a chemical, for instance, it must write a rule.243 But Congress does not mandate 
annual minimums for the number of chemicals banned, rules written, or trials litigated. Thus, 
whereas the external pressure for informed regulatory decisions slows down rule writers’ core 
activity---producing rules---it expands regulatory monitors’ basic function.  
 
B.  Market Transformations Favoring Regulatory Monitors 
 
Whatever the inherent democratic accountability deficiencies of older governance models 
may have been, new regulatory strategies were perhaps inevitable given the market transformations 
                     
234 See Zaring, supra note 194, at 208--209 (noting that financial regulators have adopted “principles-based regulation” 
that is largely unreviewable by courts and enforced informally, rather than by utilizing the rule of law). But see Daniel Walters, 
The Self-Delegation False Alarm, 118 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 58--62), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3126854 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that even with the incentives for 
vague self-delegation created by the Auer decision, agencies have a “strong[] interest in promoting clarity in the regulatory text” 
to improve enforceability because “[i]n addressing the risk of hard look review, agencies will of necessity seek to reduce 
vagueness”). 
235 See, e.g., EEOC, Fiscal Year 2015 Performance and Accountability Report 23 (2015), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/2015par.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY8C-8JER] (last visited Oct. 9, 2018) (mentioning 
how the EEOC engaged in sixty “technical assistance” visits). 
236 Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437, 439 (2003). 
237 See RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN 
BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 10-12 (2008) (describing broad uses of cost-benefit analyses and 
concluding they are “here to stay.”). 
238 Magill & Vermeule, supra note 38, at 1051. 
239 See 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501--3521 (1980) (explaining the goal of “reduc[ing] information collection burdens on the public”).  
240 See Dodd--Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 932(a)(8), 124 Stat. 
1376, 1877 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012)). 
241 See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, § 201, 124 Stat. 3885, 3923 (2011) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 350j(a)(1) (2012)). High-risk facilities must be inspected at least every three years. Id. § 421(a)(2)(B). 
242 See 43 U.S.C. § 1348(c) (2012). 
243 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(5) (Supp. V 2018). 
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of recent decades. These changes have lessened or eliminated the sophistication gap between 
regulatory monitors and lawyers, expanded information asymmetries between regulatory monitors 
and legal groups, and provided regulatory monitors with technological tools that are more helpful to 
them than to rule makers or litigators.  
 
1. Increased Sophistication 
 
Modern businesses have reached unprecedented size and complexity. All major industries 
have become more concentrated, creating bigger organizations with separate multimillion-dollar 
product lines. Oil companies have built ever larger floating cities drilling miles deeper under the 
ocean floor,244 manufacturers release thousands of new chemicals into the environment annually,245 
and large businesses deploy big data computer algorithms for key decisions.246  
These transformations mean that an agency seeking to continue performing the same level 
of monitoring must now deploy additional regulatory monitors. Until recently, an examiner could 
“storm[] into the bank, count[] the cash, add[] up the deposits, look[] at a sampling of the loans, and 
pronounce[] the work done.”247 Today, “[t]he sheer depth of complexity that afflicts bank balance 
sheets prevents even experts from discerning what banks own and owe, what they sold and received, 
and whether they are compliant with . . . hundreds of banking statutes.”248 At large banks, it takes a 
team of examiners many months to do what used to be wrapped up by one examiner in a half-day 
visit.249 
More complex markets also require greater expertise, including advanced degrees, continuing 
education, and “leading experts in the most esoteric financial fields.”250 Regulatory monitors have 
varying backgrounds. In banking, examiners tend to have finance backgrounds. Oil inspectors often 
have engineering degrees. FDA drug reviewers are typically scientists, doctors, or statisticians,251 and 
many USDA facilities inspectors are veterinarians.252 Agencies have raised salaries to accommodate 
the additional educational requirements.253  
As markets and businesses become more complex, monitors’ main object of analysis 
becomes more like lawyers’ main object of analysis---the law, which is also complex. Greater 
business sophistication may thus lessen the gap between monitors and lawyers, to the extent that 
both groups increasingly require greater technical expertise.  
                     
244 See BSEE Annual Report, supra note 19, at 15 (noting the increase in drill rigs). 
245 Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 115, 163--64 (2004). 
246 See Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1311, 1331--32 
(2015). 
247 See Hawke, supra note 94, at 2. 
248 Conti-Brown, supra note 101, at 165. 
249 See Hawke, supra note 94, at 2--3. 
250 See id. at 8. 
251 FDA’s Drug Review Process, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm289601.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4LVD-YVAE] (last updated Aug. 24, 2015). 
252 USDA Inspection, supra note 12, at 15. 
253  BSEE Budget, supra note 5, at 55, 64 (requesting more funding for inspectors due to “increased complexity in OCS 
oil and gas activities”). 
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2. Faster Innovation  
 
The rate of market changes has accelerated to unprecedented levels, meaning that many of 
today’s “routine” products were until recently “exotic or nonexistent.”254 Therefore, new employees 
who join an agency will soon have large knowledge gaps without continual updates. They can obtain 
some of this through phone calls, conferences, and other voluntary mechanisms.255 Yet much of the 
relevant information---the nature of Bank of America’s latest automated financial advisor or Ford’s 
self-driving car---is closely guarded as a trade secret and impenetrable from the outside. Complexity, 
secrecy, and innovation mean that inspectors “rely on industry representatives to explain the 
technology at a facility.”256 
Those explanations will not be expressed in regulatory monitors’ reports, which focus on 
violations. Nor would it be practical or even legal to transmit all of the first-hand data observed 
directly into a report. As a result, agencies’ other internal experts, such as scientists in the rulemaking 
division, will often lack understanding of the latest market developments---an understanding that is 
indispensable for dynamic regulation.257 Even if the raw monitoring data were somehow made 
available to agency actors other than monitors, processing that data would prove difficult for those 
who---unlike monitors---have not benefitted from industry representatives’ ongoing explanations.  
Regulatory monitors may thus hold information monopolies compared not only to other 
legal actors, but also to other technocrats in the agency, such as nonlawyer technical experts in the 
rulewriting department. Rapidly changing markets shift the locus of business expertise further inside 
the firm, and thereby shift expertise within the agency more toward those who regularly operate 
inside the firm: regulatory monitors. 
 
3. Technological Tools  
 
Every bureaucrat, including litigators, has more access to information than ever before. 
However, while information technologies can speed up legal research, they are less able to speed up 
court dockets or public notice-and-comment periods. To the contrary, information technologies 
enable more parties to participate in formal agency decisionmaking processes, even submitting tens 
of thousands of fake comments for proposed rules.258 These advances slow down rulemaking by 
increasing the information that must be processed and the stakeholders that must be managed.  
                     
254 See, e.g., Hawke, supra note 94, at 6. 
255 Coglianese et al., supra note 37, at 330. 
256 Deepwater Report, supra note 5, at 77; see also Conti-Brown, supra note 101, at 165. 
257 Wendy Wagner et al., Dynamic Rulemaking, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 183, 197 (2017) (positing that “some agencies operate 
in such rapidly changing technological environments that one would expect them to be adjusting their rules periodically to 
prevent entire programs from becoming obsolete”). 
258 James V. Grimaldi & Paul Overberg, Many Comments Critical of ‘Fiduciary’ Rule Are Fake, Wall St. J. (Dec. 27, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/many-comments-critical-of-fiduciary-rule-are-fake-1514370601 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
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In contrast, because regulatory monitors do not have the same external procedural 
constraints, their most substantial limit is the resources required to transmit and analyze information. 
When information submission becomes too burdensome, businesses may object. Additionally, 
regulatory monitors’ travel to business locations to look through paperwork has traditionally 
consumed considerable monitoring funds and time. Even if volumes of paperwork were obtained, 
human resources constrained regulatory monitors’ ability to sift through that paperwork. 
Technologies have reduced these barriers by providing remote monitoring devices that 
continuously transmit data, such as EPA sensory equipment on space satellites and inside factories 
that tracks businesses’ pollution.259 Billions of daily transactional data flow from energy companies 
to FERC260 and from securities firms to the SEC.261 Interagency pooling of these technologies 
multiplies the available data.262 Regulatory monitors then analyze these big data sets with advanced 
modeling and machine-learning algorithms.263 As a result, in various agencies, “on-site time as a 
percentage of overall examination hours dropped,”264 and “inspectors . . . conduct[ed] more 
thorough inspections.”265 Today, holding employees constant, regulatory monitors can process more 
nonpublic data more thoroughly, extending the reach of their core authority.  
Thus, unlike in the mid-1800s, national bank examiners’ appearance today is less likely to get 
“the bank force . . . dancing at [their] beck and call.”266 Instead, modern regulatory monitors more 
suitably meet with a senior executive or engineer running a large, self-regulating compliance system. 
Technologies convert what was previously a “one-time snapshot of performance taken on a 
particular inspection day” to a “‘movie’ of the plant’s processes.”267 Disruption is minimized because 
in some industries firms never stop working for---or collaborating with---regulatory monitors.  
 
III. An Overview of Regulatory Monitors Today 
 
The discussion so far has shown that changes over the past century in statutes, governance, 
and markets have formed the foundation for regulatory monitors’ ascendancy to a lead role within 
the administrative state. But authority on the books and the authority demanded by external realities 
do not necessarily translate into authority used. Courts have held that an agency’s decisions about 
the extent to which it “‘monitors’ as well as ‘enforces’ compliance fall squarely within the agency’s 
                     
259 See Esty, supra note 245, at 156. 
260 FERC, 2016 Rep. on Enforcement 52 (2016), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2016/11-17-16-
enforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/XFY7-U9JA]FERC. 
261 Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., supra note 210, at 1. 
262 See, e.g., NIH, Report on NIH Collaborations with Other HHS Agencies for Fiscal Year 2017, 
https://report.nih.gov/crs/ [https://perma.cc/GS84-FTEP] (last updated June 30, 2018) (describing “interagency 
collaborations that enable agencies to combine their knowledge and diverse expertise to accomplish their collective mission”).  
263 See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning 
Era, 105 Geo. L.J. 1147, 1160--67 (2017).  
264 See Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., supra note 210, at 5 (estimating a decrease from thirty-two percent to nineteen percent). 
265  BSEE Budget, supra note 5, at 32. 
266 See Henry, supra note 99, at 241; see also Hawke, supra note 94. 
267 See Freeman, supra note 30, at 60 (quoting Interview with Bill Patton, Director of XL, EPA Region 4 (Mar. 14, 1997)) 
(describing EPA upgrades); see also Hawke, supra note 94, at 9 (describing the OCC’s “ongoing . . . on- and off-site 
monitoring”). 
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exercise of discretion.”268 Inertia and internal politics influence organizational design. While the 
recent literature has helped lay the foundations for understanding why monitoring has become 
important, empirical evidence of actual regulatory monitors exercising that authority has been 
anecdotal or localized.  
A fundamental empirical question thus remains unanswered: How big a role do regulatory 
monitors play in the regulatory state today? More specifically, how do regulatory monitors influence 
the administration of the law? While recognizing that “the sheer bewildering heterogeneity of the 
administrative state makes it impossible to generalize about the allocation effects of agency 
structure,”269 this Part provides the first systematic empirical evidence of the role that regulatory 
monitors play in the federal regulatory process. The evidence not only indicates the scope of 
regulatory monitors’ presence in the administrative process but begins to map out key agency 
organizational design choices shaping regulatory monitors’ influence. 
 
A.  Monitoring Firms 
 
Resource allocation is one of many “modes of governance”270 through which political leaders 
exercise power.271 Statutes commonly provide an “incomplete design,” leaving agency heads to finish 
the task of deciding how many regulatory monitors and lawyers to hire, and how to use them.272 This 
section provides the first data on how these decisions have allocated regulatory monitoring and legal 
resources across all large U.S. regulators.273  
In many agencies---such as banking regulators, the Mine Safety and Health Administration, 
and the USDA’s Food Safety & Inspection Service---the federal personnel database or some public 
report provided a clear figure for the number of personnel devoted to monitoring.274 In other 
agencies, such as the FCC, FDA and EPA, monitors are officially listed in other categories such as 
scientists, veterinarians, and engineers. A category was counted as monitors only when other sources 
indicated that it was mostly comprised of monitors. It is possible that some of these categories 
                     
268 Gillis v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 759 F.2d 565, 576 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 
80 F.3d 1121, 1129--31 (6th Cir. 1996) (ruling that the Department of Health and Human Services’ decision not to collect data 
about racial disparities in health services was unreviewable). 
269 Magill & Vermeule, supra note 38, at 1059. 
270 See Rubin, supra note 63, at 97 (noting that resource allocation is a “new mode[] of governance” not recognized by the 
Administrative Procedure Act). 
271 Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 17 (2008) (discussing 
the “centrality of resource allocation to decisionmaking” and noting that Congress, the President, and other executive officers 
direct agency resources to prioritize “different problems, concerns, dreams, and goals); see also Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers 
Union v. OSHA, 145 F.3d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1998) (denying a petition that would have the court “intrude into the quintessential 
discretion of the Secretary of Labor to allocate OSHA’s resources and set its priorities”). 
272 See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 4(f), 48 Stat. 1064, 1067 (1934) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 
154(f) (2012)); Mitchell Pearsall Reich, Incomplete Designs, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 807, 810 (2016) (explaining “the implicit delegation 
of institutional decisions to downstream actors”).  
273 For a description of how the agencies were chosen, see supra section I.B.  
274 Agency personnel figures are mostly from the OPM. See U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., supra note 75. They are 
supplemented by interviews, annual reports, and other sources as necessary. For instance, the Federal Reserve does not report 
its personnel, which necessitated relying on annual reports and interviews. 
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include personnel who do not directly monitor, which would cause my figures to overstate the 
number of monitors. It is also possible that other categories include monitors that I was unable to 
identify, thereby causing my figures to understate monitors’ presence in some agencies. Assumptions 
are noted in the appendices, and more focused study of those agencies’ sub-categories would be 
needed to obtain more precise figures. 
Data constraints also limit the figures for legal personnel. Although the main object of 
comparison here is between enforcement lawyers and monitors, for most regulators the legal figures 
available combine all legal positions---including those working in rule writing and the office of the 
general counsel. Consequently, the proportions below understate monitors’ presence relative to 
enforcement lawyers.  
Among the nineteen agencies studied, only three---the FTC, NLRB, and EEOC---have 
relatively few regulatory-monitor personnel. These three are litigator-dominant, with law-related 
employees comprising over eighty-five percent of the total regulatory monitor--legal personnel.275 
Those three are also the only agencies in the set that have no visitation authority.276 Interviews 
confirmed that most of these agencies’ lawyers litigate.277 This classification as litigator-dominant 
differs from a prominent 1980s descriptor of some agency groups as “legalistic,” a term which could 
apply to regulatory monitors.278 
The remaining fifteen agencies all have material numbers of regulatory monitors, both in 
absolute terms and relative to legal personnel. The five hybrids have some balance between the 
groups: the CFPB, EPA, FCC, FERC, and SEC.279 In the remaining eleven agencies, regulatory 
monitors make up over eighty-five percent of the combined regulatory-monitor and legal workforce, 
making them monitor-dominant.280  
Figure 1: Monitors at Large Agencies.  
                     
275 See infra Appendix A. 
276 See supra section I.A. 
277 Telephone Interview with EEOC Employee (Apr. 25, 2017); Telephone Interview with NLRB Employee (Apr. 4, 
2017); Interview with FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection Employee (Apr. 12, 2017) [hereinafter FTC Interview]. 
278 The term “legalistic” is a broader concept that was used to describe, for example, some types of inspectors who 
operated in a more by-the-book manner. See Bardach & Kagan, supra note 41, at 93 (illustrating this concept).  
279 See infra Appendix A.  
280 See infra Appendix A. 
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To what extent do personnel reflect monitoring activity? That question is one of the many in 
administrative law lacking empirical evidence showing the connection between agency design and 
agency behavior.281 Activity data is less consistently available, and comparable, than human-resource 
data.282 Any given agency might decide to devote the same number of workers to a small number of 
                     
281 See Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, Agency Design and Political Control, 126 Yale L.J. 1002, 1007 (2017) 
(“[T]here has been very little quantitative scholarship that establishes a link between agency design and a similar agency output 
across agencies or over time.”). 
282 See infra section IV.A.1. 
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thorough inspections or a large number of light-touch inspections, meaning that one cannot infer 
that the agency with fewer inspections is monitoring less. Nor can this Article establish a definitive 
link between design and behavior. Nonetheless, as common sense would indicate, agencies with 
sizeable regulatory-monitor workforces (both hybrids and monitor-dominant agencies) tend to 
report extensive monitoring activity.283  
Even litigator-dominant agencies exercise some amount of statutory monitoring authority, 
but their monitoring comprises a small part of their information collection. For example, the 
litigator-dominant EEOC uses its confidential data collected on gender and racial breakdowns to 
launch systemic discrimination investigations, but those account for less than one percent of its total 
investigations.284 Although FTC competition lawyers regularly rely on a key monitoring program---
premerger report submissions---for consumer protection, the agency depends on nonstatutorily-
acquired information sources such as industry conferences, online consumer complaints, or litigators 
watching television in search of deceptive ads.285  
The remaining sixteen agencies---eighty-four percent of the group---conduct significant 
monitoring, albeit with great variation.286 Among hybrid agencies, for instance, the EPA completes 
over ten thousand on-site inspections annually.287 The FERC and the SEC analyze large volumes of 
business records and transactional data.288  
Monitor-dominant agencies tend to have higher monitoring volumes and greater likelihood 
of continuous presence. In 2016, the FDA conducted 164,696 surprise tobacco inspections alone, of 
retailers ranging from CVS to mom-and-pop stores.289 The NRC’s “resident inspectors”290 and the 
                     
283 See infra Appendix A. 
284 2016 EEOC Performance & Accountability Rep. 12, 93 https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/2016par.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3G28-7X9A]  (identifying 245 systemic, agency-initiated Commissioner Charges and directed investigations 
in contrast to the 91,503 total charges investigated); see also EEOC, A Review of the Systemic Program of the U.S. Equal 
Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n 16 (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/systemic/review/upload/review.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X9B7-APV9] (explaining that “Commissioner Charges and directed investigations” are used  “when the 
agency learns of a problem or there is reason to believe that discrimination may be more widespread or of a different nature 
than an individual charge alleges”). The EEOC receives cases mostly from employees. See id. at 34. 
285 See Lesley Fair, The Truth About False Advertising, Presentation at Boston University 16 (Apr. 14, 2017) (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (FTC attorney explaining the FTC’s “Ad Monitoring” and other sources of information in a 
presentation attended by the author). 
286 See infra Appendix A.  
287 See infra Appendix A. 
288 See infra Appendix A; see also FERC, supra note 260, at 34--35 (describing FERC’s extensive audit and accounting 
division); U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, FY 2017 Congressional Budget Justification 6--7 (2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy17congbudgjust.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TYX-UCQC] (noting that “analysis of 
large datasets, including . . . trading data in equities, options, municipal bonds, and other securities” is important to detect 
misconduct and describing the SEC’s plan to “improve[] data analysis capabilities” by “invest[ing] in IT”). The CFPB has 
extensive onsite and remote records-examination programs, while the FCC inspects television and radio broadcasters 
nationwide and regularly collects business records. See infra Appendix A. 
289 See Compliance Check Inspections of Tobacco Product Retailers, FDA, 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/oce/inspections/oce_insp_searching.cfm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
290 Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Assessment of Efficiencies to Be Gained by Consolidating or Eliminating Regional 
Offices, http://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0314/ML031470121.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQ6E-ZGE5] (last visited Oct. 11, 2018).  
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Federal Reserve’s “examination teams”291 provide a year-round presence at nuclear plants and the 
largest banks.  
Personnel numbers have limits in what they say about an institution. Agencies with the same 
proportion of employees may distribute authority dissimilarly through divergent structural decisions. 
Regulators may enforce only a small portion of the agency’s authority through on-site visits, as is the 
case with FCC television and radio station inspections, or a broader array of activities, as is the case 
with the CFPB examinations of financial institutions.292 The following sections discuss those and 
other high-impact design choices. Nonetheless, if the literature is correct that personnel numbers 
reflect power and priorities,293 only sixteen percent of the major regulators studied clearly favor 
lawyers, while more than half prioritize regulatory monitors.294  
 
B.  Enforcing Law 
 
Regulatory monitors, like police officers, do more than patrol. To varying degrees across 
agencies, they also make enforcement decisions. Agencies have a “graduated enforcement 
continuum”295 ranging from warning letters to prosecution. That range of activities has been 
illustrated through a conceptual pyramid, replicated in Figure 2, in which “the proportion of space at 
each layer represents the proportion of enforcement activity.”296 At the larger bottom layer of the 
pyramid are persuasion and warning letters, and above is smaller space for formal procedures such 
as civil penalties.297 The pyramid does not speak directly to groups within the agency, but implies 
that those managing the bottom layer of mostly unreviewable conduct control a large portion of 
enforcement.298  
An agency’s designers can set up organizational processes that require regulatory monitors to 
hand over a case at the first sign of wrongdoing, reserving almost all major enforcement decisions in 
the pyramid for other groups, such as enforcement lawyers. Litigator-dominant agencies tend to 
adopt such a structure. Regulatory monitors at hybrid and monitor-dominant agencies, however, 
play a meaningful role in decisions far along the enforcement spectrum. Some regulatory monitors 
even act as something close to a prosecutor. An overview of that enforcement participation follows, 
broken down into (1) citations, recommendations, and warnings, (2) blocking business activities, (3) 
public shaming, (4) increased monitoring as punishment, and (5) control over investigations and 
charges. 
                     
291 See Levitin, supra note 52, at 2044. 
292 Interview with FCC Senior Attorney (Apr. 13, 2017) (describing how engineers regularly inspect stations and both 
engineers and lawyers analyze mandatory reports submitted); Interview with Attorney (Apr. 26, 2017) (stating that his clients, 
communication-sector companies, must regularly submit large volumes of information to the FCC); CFPB Interview, supra 
note 216. 
293 See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
294 See infra Appendix A (EP); see also supra Figure 1. 
295 See, e.g., BSEE Annual Report, supra note 19, at 23. 
296 See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 30, at 35. 
297 See id. 
298 Ayres and Braithwaite provide examples of regulatory monitors only in passing, and do not explore the implications of 
responsive regulation for various internal agency groups. See id. 
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1. Citations, Recommendations, and Warnings 
 
Beginning at the base levels of the pyramid, there is evidence that regulatory monitors drive 
this enforcement activity at fifteen of the nineteen largest regulators.300 For example, FERC 
monitors possess the authority to issue public “noncompliance” notifications and direct nonpublic 
settlement agreements.301 Although not all agencies release such figures, those that are available in 
agency reports reflect the pyramid’s space allocation in that the quantity of less formal activity is 
significantly greater than more formal proceedings.302 For instance, in fiscal year 2016, the FDA’s 
inspections group issued 14,590 warning letters, while its legal division took only twenty-one 
enforcement actions.303 
In terms of behavioral impact, these recommendations can be far-reaching. Compliance 
varies across time and agencies, but there are indications that in diverse industries companies 
                     
299 This figure is based on Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 30, at 35. 
300 This includes all agencies except the FCC, EEOC, NLRB, and FTC. See infra Appendix B. 
301 See, e.g., FERC, supra note 260, at 39. 
302 See infra Appendix B. 
303 FDA, FDA Enforcement Statistics Summary Fiscal Year 2016, 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/EnforcementActions/UCM540606.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NKR-WXLE] (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2018). Used here, “enforcement actions” encompasses injunctions and seizures. See id.  
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cooperate when informally advised to take a course of action.304 Even the recommendations of 
regulatory monitors at hybrid agencies can lead to substantial payouts, albeit less than those of 
litigators. In a recent six-month period, CFPB examinations prompted financial institutions to 
refund $44 million to consumers, while the enforcement group secured $82 million.305  
Why would a firm comply with these expensive recommendations?306 Despite being 
“advisory,” they carry the threat of harsher follow-up. As the FDA’s manual notes, the warning 
letter provides “an opportunity to take voluntary and prompt corrective action before [FDA] 
initiates an enforcement action.”307 Moreover, regulatory monitors’ requests may not need backup 
from an agency’s litigation group, as the rest of this section explains.  
 
2. Blocking Business Activity  
 
A more intrusive enforcement power comes in the form of preventing business operations 
ex ante or suspending market access ex post. In at least eleven of the nineteen agencies, regulatory 
monitors exercise such authority.308 Ex ante approval may be required only for new activities, such 
as launching new medical devices or opening a new bank branch.309 Other times agencies must 
approve daily activities, as is the case for every chicken carcass sold in the United States.310  
After a product enters the market, many regulatory monitors can order or request a halt in 
operations. Federal regulators can recall toys, automobiles, and food based on health or safety 
concerns.311 Environmental inspectors can shut down companies that are discharging hazardous 
                     
304 See FERC, supra note 260, at 35 (reporting that in fiscal year 2016, energy companies implemented ninety-eight 
percent of FERC’s “audit recommendations” within six months); Richard M. Cooper & John R. Fleder, Responding to a Form 
483 or Warning Letter: A Practical Guide, 60 Food & Drug L.J. 479, 480 (2005) (noting that food companies typically comply 
with FDA inspectors’ requests); Interview with Former FDIC Employee (Mar. 10, 2017) (stating that financial institutions 
“almost always” comply with examiners’ requests). 
305 2016 CFPB Semi-Ann. Rep. 11, 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/Report.Spring_2016_SAR.06.28.16.Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/T84Y-
TFWB]. At FERC, auditors identified energy-company noncompliance that led to customer refunds and price reductions 
amounting to $5.3 million, less than a third of the $18 million for litigators. See FERC, supra note 260, at 12, 39. 
306 Cf. Parrillo, supra note 18, at 37 (discussing factors that incentivize regulated parties to follow guidance, including: “(A) 
pre-approval requirements, (B) investment in relationships to the agency, (C) intra-firm constituencies for compliance beyond 
legal requirements, and (D) the risks associated with one-off enforcement”).  
307 See FDA, supra note 228, at 2. 
308 The eleven agencies are the FDA, OCC, USDA (FSIS), FAA, FCC, FDIC, Federal Reserve, FMCSA, MSHA, SEC, 
and NRC. See infra Appendix B.  
309 See 12 C.F.R. § 303.40(2018) (noting that banks must apply to the FDIC before establishing a branch); About FDA 
Product Approval, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/ProductsApprovals/ucm106288.htm [https://perma.cc/UM63-
UCGS] (last updated December 29, 2017) (explaining which products are subject to ex ante review by the FDA). . 
310 See USDA Inspection, supra note 12, at 15.  
311 See, e.g., Toy Recall Statistics, Consumer Product Safety Commission, https://www.cpsc.gov/Safety-Education/Toy-
Recall-Statistics [https://perma.cc/M64E-SCRP] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (noting the number of toys recalled in each year 
from 2008--2018); Safety Issues and Recalls, National Highway Safety Administration, https://www.nhtsa.gov/recalls 
[https://perma.cc/7HBX-9VU9] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (describing the NHTSA’s recall program); FDA, Recalls, Market 
Withdrawals, & Safety Alerts, https://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls/ [https://perma.cc/Y4DP-QEJL] (last updated Sept. 27, 
2018) (describing the scope of the FDA’s food recall powers and listing recent recalls). 
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chemicals.312 Restraints on business activity can significantly hurt a firm, both in terms of immediate 
lost revenues and longer-term loss of clients who may have been relying on the provision of some 
output at a given time. 
 
3. Public Shaming  
 
Whereas the other categories of sanctions rely on directly punishing the business, public 
shaming takes an indirect approach. Many agencies publicly post the name of the business alongside 
the violations identified by regulatory monitors.313 One can learn, for example, that in 2014, oil 
inspectors shut down certain offshore Exxon operations thirteen times.314 A January 27, 2017 
OSHA inspection of an Amazon warehouse uncovered a “serious” worker health violation leading 
to a $5,975 fine.315 On March 2, 2017, FDA inspectors caught Wal-Mart selling tobacco to minors in 
cities ranging from Memphis, Tennessee, to Scottsdale, Arizona.316  
The posting of such information can be seen as a form of transparency---a means for the 
public to know what their government agents are doing---rather than as a sanction. But companies 
fear bad regulatory publicity, a risk that has grown in the internet era because sanction results can 
spread more easily.317 Given that a few thousand dollars in fines is insignificant to a large company, 
the public posting of monitoring violations enables some regulatory monitors to have greater 
enforcement power over businesses.  
 
4. The Process as Punishment  
 
Another indirect enforcement mechanism is agencies’ discretion to increase monitoring 
intensity.318 Regulators sometimes formally announce that good behavior will lessen oversight.319 But 
                     
312 See 30 C.F.R. § 250.101 (2012) (providing an overview of BSEE’s authority); BSEE Annual Report, supra note 19, at 
23--24 (describing BSEE’s enforcement approach and listing various incidents of noncompliance that the agency addressed in 
2015); Telephone Interview with Former EPA Employee A (Apr. 12, 2017). 
313 In other industries, such as finance, examiners’ reports are private. The CFPB aggregate reports provide some detail 
about its examiners’ findings without identifying companies. See 2016 CFPB Semi-Ann. Rep., supra note 305, at 75.  
314 BSEE Data Center, Bureau of Safety & Envtl. Enf’t, https://www.data.bsee.gov [https://perma.cc/P8T5-QUCJ] (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2018).  
315 Inspection Detail, OSHA, https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=1206314.015 
[https://perma.cc/5PZN-VCS8] (last visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
316 See FDA, No. 17AZ000611, Warning Letter Regarding Tobacco Retailer Inspection Violations, to Wal-Mart (Mar. 2, 
2017), https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/Tobacco/ucm548852.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7ULF-894U] (EP); FDA, No. 17TN001357, Warning Letter Regarding Tobacco Retailer Inspection 
Violations, to Wal-Mart #1248, (Mar. 2, 2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/Tobacco/ucm549089.htm [https://perma.cc/P4J5-
U9KB] (EP). 
317 See Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era, 2011 BYU L. Rev. 1371, 1373 
(describing the use of negative publicity as an enforcement tactic employed by federal regulators).  
318 Professor Ed Rubin has recognized this possible use of monitoring. See Rubin, supra note x, at 125 (“Agencies can use 
investigations themselves--repeated visits by inspectors or demands for documents--as sanctions.”). 
319 See, e.g., Parrillo, supra note 18, at 45 (“The relationship between an agency and a regulated party . . . may operate at an 
institutional and official level, if, say, the agency has an announced policy of reducing the frequency of inspections for parties 
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they stop short of publicly describing monitoring as punishment, which might provoke court 
challenges.320  
Nonetheless, some agencies communicate that monitoring is both a consequence and a 
reward. OSHA, for instance, has a Voluntary Protection Program in “recognition of the outstanding 
efforts of employers,”321 which awards firms by subjecting them to fewer inspections.322 OSHA’s 
“Severe Violator Enforcement Program” involves higher penalties and “increased OSHA 
inspections in these worksites, including mandatory OSHA follow-up inspections, and inspections 
of other worksites [owned by the violator].”323 The agency explains this policy by noting that 
“[h]igher penalties and more aggressive, targeted enforcement will provide a greater deterrent.”324 
The EPA’s audit policy program officially only offers reduced penalties for violations as a reward for 
good behavior, but a statistical study found that well-behaving firms were also subject to fewer 
inspections, even controlling for other factors.325  
Regulatory monitors’ scrutiny can be costly to firms,326 and firms predictably seek to avoid 
intense monitoring.327 In negotiated rulemaking with the EPA, industry representatives have pushed 
for rewarding exemplary firms by giving them “tax credits” and “less frequent inspection audits.”328 
Thus, the threat of increased scrutiny provides one avenue for regulatory monitors to obtain 
compliance even without direct sanction authority. 
 
5. Investigations and Charges  
 
For more significant sanctions, such as large fines and the revocation of licenses, there is 
typically an investigatory phase after the regulator becomes aware of a potential violation. Regulators 
can allocate control over that investigatory process to different groups. At agencies with sizeable 
litigation divisions, such as at the SEC, enforcement lawyers control much of the investigatory 
function because they have their own investigation resources. Even at such agencies, regulatory 
monitors’ influence can extend beyond the handoff if the enforcement lawyer seeks regulatory 
monitors’ expertise or if regulatory monitors originated the case. But regulatory monitors wield less 
influence overall in such agencies.  
                                                                  
who have a good track record.”). 
320 For example, that could imply that the inspection was a final determination of rights or not part of an “administrative 
plan.” See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321 (1978) (holding, in part, that the Constitution requires agency searches 
of commercial facilities to be part of a “general administrative plan”).  
321 All About VPP, OSHA, https://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/all_about_vpp.html [https://perma.cc/XUD9-Z3B8] (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
322 OMB Watch, supra note 60, at 6--7. 
323 Press Release, OSHA, US Department of Labor’s OSHA Takes Action to Protect America’s Workers with Severe 
Violator Program and Increased Penalties (Apr. 22, 2010), https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/national/04222010 
[https://perma.cc/4KSD-59TH].  
324 See id. 
325 See Parrillo, supra note 18, at 52. 
326 See Freeman, supra note 30, at 14--17. 
327 For instance, lawyers warn that a firm ignoring an FDA inspector’s request is “likely to be subject to extraordinarily 
intense and more frequent inspections.” Cooper & Fleder, supra note 304, at 480. 
328 See Freeman, supra note 30, at 67.  
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Agencies with smaller legal groups rely more on the inspector to investigate. FAA inspectors 
will investigate and recommend an airline’s civil penalty or a pilot’s suspension before attorneys take 
over the case.329 The SEC and FAA models allow attorneys to decide the formal charges, but still 
reflect the relationships in federal criminal law enforcement, where “iterated interactions between 
agents and prosecutors will affect investigative and adjudicative decisionmaking.”330 
Alternatively, regulatory monitors may lead cases through the formal charge phase. When an 
explosion or death occurs on an offshore oil platform, inspectors investigate and build the “case” 
for civil penalties.331 Based on the inspector’s case and the company’s response, “the Reviewing 
Officer will issue a decision identifying the amount of any final civil penalty.”332 That process led to 
over $6 million in civil penalties in 2015.333 OSHA inspectors in the vast majority of cases set fines 
and negotiate final settlements with businesses without ever involving litigators.334 Thus, regulatory 
monitors may serve as investigators, prosecutors, and de facto final decisionmakers. 
 
* * * 
 
The confluence of case-specific sanction control, as well as the degree of regulatory 
monitors’ information monopoly,335 provides an overall sense of their influence over agency 
enforcement. Difficulties arise in comparing the external impact of regulatory monitors and 
litigators. One legal case or rule can establish an industry standard. Tens of thousands of warning 
letters, Incidences of Noncompliance, and citations do not attract as much attention as a $415 
million SEC legal settlement with Merrill Lynch.336 But institutionalized through large firms’ 
compliance systems, and spread across millions of transactions, even nonquantifiable regulatory 
monitors’ interventions can have far-reaching impact.  
                     
329 See L. Ronald Jorgensen, The Defense of Aviation Mechanics and Repair Facilities from Enforcement Actions of the 
Federal Aviation Administration, 54 J. Air L. & Com. 349, 375 (1988); Peyton H. Robinson, An Overview of FAA 
Enforcement Actions, Utah B.J., Nov./Dec. 2012, at 29, 29--31 (describing the steps taken by FAA monitors before FAA 
attorneys become involved).  
330 See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 751--52, 
766--67 (2003). 
331 See Civil Penalties Assessments and Appeals, Bureau of Safety & Envtl. Enf’t, https://www.bsee.gov/what-we-
do/safety-enforcement/civil-penalties-assessments-and-appeals [https://perma.cc/L5PT-83U9] [hereinafter BSEE Civil 
Penalties] (last visited Oct. 12, 2018) (describing the process for investigating and building a case file in the event of a 
violation); Telephone Interview with Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement Employees (Mar. 31, 2017) 
[hereinafter BSEE Interview ]. 
332 See BSEE Civil Penalties, supra note 331 (emphasis added). 
333 See BSEE Annual Report, supra note 19, at 23--24.  
334 See Interview with OSHA, supra note 147. After OSHA inspectors and their supervisors decide on civil penalties, 
companies may then pay, negotiate, or file a legal appeal. See id. By one regional leadership’s estimate, firms rarely appeal, and 
about eighty percent of the time a negotiation ensues. See id. OSHA inspectors do not usually involve solicitors unless the 
negotiations falter. See id. 
335 See supra section II.B.2. 
336 See e.g., Suzanne Barlyn, Merrill Lynch to Pay $415 Million for Misusing Customer Cash: SEC, Reuters (June 23, 
2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-bank-of-america-merrill-idUSKCN0Z91O8 [https://perma.cc/NUW3-
KTZC]. 
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Despite variation and comparison difficulties, regulatory monitors in at least fifteen of the 
nineteen large agencies have significant enforcement influence in several of the categories described 
above.337 Multiple levers---including statutory authority, workforce size, internal information 
reliance, formal sanctions, and planning---can shift influence away from the legal division. As more 
of these levers align at a given agency and across the administrative state, regulatory monitors 
become the drivers of regulatory enforcement.  
 
C.  Making Law 
 
Agencies make law through their determinations in individual cases and by issuing broader 
rules. Regulatory monitors contribute to each of these areas of policy development.  
 
1. Creating Common Law  
 
Since the 1990s, FTC enforcement lawyers have created a common law of privacy with 
“hardly any judicial decisions to show for it.”338 FTC lawyers have done so through settlement 
agreements, which set industry-wide practices.339 Individual regulatory-monitor determinations can 
have a similar effect. A plethora of reports, warnings, and other monitor decision results are 
available online.340  These documents offer great detail. For instance, one of the FDA’s 17,000 
warning letters from 2015 reveals that during a Deerfield, Illinois inspection of Walgreens’s over-
the-counter drug preparation, the “[i]nvestigator observed what appeared to be hundreds of dead 
insects” throughout the facilities, and a follow-up laboratory analysis revealed “spore-forming 
bacteria.”341 The FDA’s recommendations to Walgreens regarding behavioral changes are also 
specific.342  
Like a lawyer to a judge, firms use these texts to plead their case.343 The firm might argue 
that in a prior inspection at a different firm, similar observations led to different recommendations. 
                     
337 See infra Appendix B (detailing the techniques that monitors at the nineteen large agencies utilize to sanction firms). 
There was insufficient evidence to conclude that regulatory monitors at the FCC, FTC, EEOC, and NLRB had significant 
influence. See infra Appendix B. Further research into the inner workings of these agencies could produce such evidence, 
particularly at the FCC, which has a significant number of monitors and amount of monitoring activity. See infra notes 477--
479, 515--517, and accompanying text. 
338 See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 583, 
585 (2014). 
339 See id. 
340 See infra notes 368--370 and accompanying text.  
341  FDA, 2017-DAL-WL-01, Warning Letter on Walgreens Infusion Services to Paul Mastrapa, Chief Executive Officer, 
Option Care Enters., Inc. (Oct. 19, 2016), 
https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2016/ucm526853.htm [https://perma.cc/8678-J69C]. 
342 See id. (requiring the laboratory management to assess operations, including “the prevention, destruction, repellence, or 
mitigation of the specific pests that were found in the warehouse” and in particular to “assess [the] aseptic processing 
operations” using a third-party consultant). 
343 See Interview with OSHA, supra note 147 (noting that attorneys routinely rely on OSHA citations to gather 
information about violations and develop the nuances of a case); Interview with EPA, supra note 312 (noting that companies 
use decisions from one site to negotiate with the EPA for different sites). 
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The EPA has warned its inspectors to follow national procedures because “[p]olicy decisions at one 
facility can have a precedential effect on all other facilities.”344 Firms study regulatory monitors’ 
reports to learn how to operate in the future. Since the reports can contain specific 
recommendations not required by law,345 these regulatory monitors---and those who oversee them---
wield the ability to not only interpret law but to create it.  
 
2. Writing Rules  
 
Regulatory monitors’ most straightforward form of soft rulemaking is the writing of their 
employee manuals. These manuals give instructions as to what information the regulatory monitors 
should collect and how they should analyze the data they observe, often running close to a thousand 
pages in length.346 Firms meticulously study these texts to adjust behavior.347 Manuals are most 
influential in industries governed by best practices and principles-based rules, which are more 
subject to interpretation than industries with detailed codes for every violation.348 Manuals do not 
serve as the sole basis for court enforcement unless the agency treats them as substantive law and 
processes them through notice and comment.349 But a firm may still choose to follow the manual 
simply because it reflects the expectations of a powerful government actor.350  
In a minority of industries, such as finance and securities, regulatory monitors also lead 
formal rulemaking related to their expertise.351 In those agencies, it would be standard for agency 
directors or the general counsel ultimately to approve any rules written by regulatory monitors 
before subjecting them to notice and comment.352  
Regulatory monitors’ expertise enables them to influence both formal and soft rulemaking, 
but organizational configurations can lessen information asymmetries. Some agencies mandate the 
                     
344 EPA, Memorandum on Final National Policy: Role of the EPA Inspector in Providing Compliance Assistance During 
Inspections (2003), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/inspectorrole.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HU3B-9ZR8].  
345 See supra section II.A.2.  
346 See EPA, EPA Pub. No. 305-K-17-001, NPDES Compliance Inspection Manual (2017), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-01/documents/npdesinspect.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7R4-V2SK] (totaling 
918 pages); CFPB, CFPB Supervision and Examination Manual (2012), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manual-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/GGP5-
7C4Q] (totaling 924 pages). 
347 See McGarity, supra note 226, at 1393--96 (providing an example of a waste generator examining agency text for 
guidance). 
348 See supra section II.A.2. 
349 See United States v. Bioclinical Sys., Inc., 666 F. Supp. 82, 83 (D. Md. 1987) (“Congress has mandated that a full and 
deliberate public process, including the making of recommendations by a broad-based advisory committee and the opportunity 
for public hearing, be followed before the FDA may establish a GMP.”). 
350 See supra section III.B.1.  
351 See FERC, supra note 260, at 58 (describing a FERC regulatory monitor’s recent writing of a rule for notice and 
comment); BSEE Interview, supra note 331 (stating that Department of the Interior regulatory monitors draft offshore-energy 
regulations). 
352 See Raymond P. Baldwin & Livingston Hall, Using Government Lawyers to Animate Bureaucracy, 63 Yale L.J 197, 
198 (1953) (The stated duties of an Office of General Counsel include: . . . preparing and reviewing administrative rules, 
regulations and reports, and drafting proposed legislation; and . . . participating in the policy-making process of the agency.”). 
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sharing of regulatory monitors’ reports with a separate rulemaking group, which analyzes the reports 
for trends.353 At many agencies, the regulatory monitors’ division leads authorship of manuals, 
subject to legal review.354 Others assign the manual writing to the rulemaking group, giving external 
groups more control over regulatory monitor-related policymaking.355  
However, the location of the individuals managing the process does not give the full picture. 
The manuals are hundreds of pages long and often delve into esoteric considerations such as, in the 
case of FAA flight inspectors, the need to avoid “signals . . . that are greater than 48 µA in the 90 Hz 
direction from the glide slope crosspointer value.”356 The rules themselves may be similarly detailed. 
Due to the technical density, even when the rulemaking group writes manuals or rules they may 
need help drafting the text unless they previously served as regulatory monitors. As a former EPA 
senior attorney described the process, the manual writer in Washington, D.C. may have no field 
experience, and instead manages a working group of regional inspectors to draft the actual text.357  
 
IV. Implications and Limits on Regulatory Monitors 
 
The previous Part showed the breadth and structure of modern regulatory monitors’ power. 
An individual regulatory monitor’s impact is rarely as salient as Dr. Kelsey’s was during the 
thalidomide period.358 Instead, such life-altering regulatory-monitor impact is broadly 
institutionalized. The FAA articulates the organizational trifecta by describing its inspectors as 
serving to “develop, administer, and enforce the regulations and standards relating to aviation 
safety.”359 These functions create a virtuous cycle. Regulatory monitors regularly write or advocate 
for rules and policies that give them more data.360 Better data equips them to more forcefully 
advocate policy and enforcement priorities. As would be expected in an administrative state beset by 
rule ossification and intent on informed collaboration with industry, regulatory monitors have 
emerged in the compliance era wielding considerable administrative power.  
The claim that regulatory monitors lie at the heart of the regulatory state implicates 
prominent administrative law and policy debates. With the administrative lens adjusted for 
regulatory monitors’ full status, they inevitably become targets in the tug-of-war among Congress, 
                     
353 See supra section II.B; cf. Nou, supra note 42, at 425--31 (discussing broadly similar mechanisms).  
354 See Bioclinical Sys., Inc., 666 F. Supp. at 83--84 (suggesting that the FDA’s Office of Compliance writes its “inspectional 
guidelines,” which are then published by the Center for Devices and Radiological health); Interview with OSHA, supra note 
147; CFPB Interview, supra note 216. 
355 See, e.g., USDA Inspection, supra note 12, at 18 (“[The Office of] Policy and Program Development develops 
regulations as well instructions for inspectors to implement these regulations.”).  
356 FAA, United States Standard Flight Inspection Manual 15-65 (2015). 
357 Interview with EPA, supra note 312.  
358 See supra notes 56--59 and accompanying text. 
359 U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., OPM GS-1825, Aviation Safety Series (1973), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-
oversight/classification-qualifications/classifying-general-schedule-positions/standards/1800/gs1825.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F7ZV-8YGT].  
360 See, e.g., Amendments to Form ADV and Investment Advisers Act Rules, 80 Fed. Reg. 33,718, [pincite] (Jun. 12, 2015) 
(proposing significant new reporting requirements for mutual funds and other registered investment companies); FERC, supra 
note 260, at 52, 58 (proposing new energy-data submission requirements). 
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the President, and interest groups for external control over agencies.361 Regulatory monitors also 
necessarily compete with other internal groups for influence over the agency’s actions. This Part 
takes up the questions of external and internal influence in turn, and identifies a set of legal and 
organizational design choices that determine how regulatory monitors can best serve their agencies’ 
missions.  
 
A.  External Accountability Mechanisms  
 
One of the central questions in administrative law is the appropriate balance of 
accountability and independence for unelected bureaucrats.362 Both laws and organizational design 
alter the balance of accountability and independence. Some of these constraints guard against 
regulatory monitoring inactivity---most notably, statutory minimums. Others could prevent either 
inactivity or excess; for instance, public disclosures and paper trails promote transparency, and the 
officer appointments process ensures that monitor leaders are publicly vetted in advance.  
 
1. Public Disclosures  
 
Visibility can bring accountability to unelected officials, in the broader sense of improving 
the exercise of authority. Immediately after her 1981 appointment by President Reagan, EPA 
Administrator Ann Gorsuch suspended hazardous waste rules and reduced legal cases by eighty-four 
percent.363 An “awakened, angry and energized public,”364 sensing that businesses had captured the 
agency, paved the way for Gorsuch’s resignation in less than two years.365 Visibility can also curtail 
excesses, as demonstrated by the increased oversight that viral videos of police officer abuses 
prompted.366  
Changes to regulatory monitors are less salient. Whereas agency rules and litigation are by 
default public, regulatory monitors’ reports need not be. Bank examiners and occupational 
inspectors---unlike police officers and enforcement lawyers---operate mostly in private spaces, 
making it difficult for third parties to document excesses.367  
                     
361 Currently, various stakeholders outside the agency can influence regulatory monitors. One study of President Obama’s 
first year cited mostly regulatory monitors’ activity in concluding that agencies “appear to be exercising their enforcement 
authority more strenuously than they had in recent years.” See OMB Watch, supra note 60, at 4. As President Trump has 
sought to reorganize the executive branch, regulatory monitors have provided options. See supra notes 62--63 and 
accompanying text. 
362 See Lemos, supra note 46, at 946; see also Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. Legal 
Analysis 185, 186--87 (2014) (arguing that more accountability is not always necessarily in the public’s best interests). 
363 See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 L. & 
Contemp. Probs. 311, 344 (1991). 
364 See William D. Ruckelshaus, A Lesson Trump and the E.P.A. Should Heed, N.Y. Times (Mar. 7, 2017),  
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/opinion/a-lesson-trump-and-the-epa-should-heed.html (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
365 See Lazarus, supra note 363, at 344--46.  
366 Scott Calvert and Valerie Bauerlein, Viral Videos Shape Views of Conduct, Wall St. J. (Dec. 30, 2015),  
https://www.wsj.com/articles/viral-videos-shape-views-of-police-conduct-1451512011 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
367 See, e.g., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Policies and Procedures Manual: Bank Supervision 14 (2017), 
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Elected officials have begun to chip away at regulatory-monitor secrecy. In 2011, President 
Obama ordered agencies to “make . . . information concerning their regulatory compliance and 
enforcement activities” such as “administrative inspections, examinations, reviews, warnings, [and] 
citations” available for online search.368 Executive agencies have accommodated. For instance, for 
each inspection, the FDA posts any noncompliance identified, “voluntary” recommendation 
made,369 and overturned findings.370 The Trump administration attracted considerable attention 
when it cut off public access in other areas, such as White House visitor logs.371 President Obama’s 
directive thus may subtly constrain the Trump administration from taking contrary action.  
Congress has also contributed to the transparency framework. In 2010 it required agencies to 
publicize “the tabulation, calculation, or recording of activity or effort that can be expressed in a 
quantitative or qualitative manner.”372 Although this law does not mention regulatory monitors, 
major regulators release statistics such as the number of examinations.373 Consequently, aggregate 
changes, like cuts in examination numbers, are now more visible in many agencies. 
In some agency-specific statutes, Congress has gone further. The Clean Air Act, for example, 
requires publication of any auditor’s “preliminary determination” that an internal system should be 
revised.374 Dodd--Frank mandated that the SEC release reports summarizing examination findings,375 
a break with the financial regulation tradition of “on-site examiners who enforce quite informally 
and often on a face-to-face and confidential, instead of a written and public, basis.”376 
This transparency framework, despite some value, is variant and unstable. Independent 
agencies, except when required by statute,377 have complied less thoroughly with President Obama’s 
directive than have executive agencies,378 and a new president could easily issue a contrary order. 
                                                                  
https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2017/ppm-5310-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZDR2-T7G8]; Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, Policies and Procedures Manual: Bank Supervision 4--7 (2016), https://www.occ.gov/news-
issuances/bulletins/2016/bulletin-2016-5a.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TRJ-ECF5]. 
368 See Memorandum on Regulatory Compliance, 76 Fed. Reg. 3825, 3825 (Jan. 18, 2011) (codified at 3 C.F.R. 326, 327 
(2012)).  
369 Data Dashboard, FDA, https://datadashboard.fda.gov [perma] (last visited Dec. 30, 2017). 
370 See Inspection Classification Definitions, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/ucm223231.htm 
[https://perma.cc/TN2B-6EL4] (last updated Nov. 28, 2017) (noting that findings from FDA inspections may be overturned 
during Agency review and that such reversals will be reflected in a public database); see also BSEE Data Center, supra note 314 
(providing similar information for oil regulation).  
371 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, White House to Keep Its Visitor Logs Secret, N.Y. Times (Apr. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/us/politics/visitor-log-white-house-trump.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
372 GPRA Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-352, § 3, 124 Stat. 3866, 3867--71 (2011) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1115 
(2012)). 
373 See infra Appendix A. 
374 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2571 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
7412(r)(7)(B)(iii) (2012)) (requiring the EPA to promulgate regulations providing for agency audits of risk management plans 
and requiring such plans to be available to the public); 40 C.F.R. § 68.220(i) (2012) (implementing the directive of § 7412(r) by 
providing for audits and requiring the public to have access to “the preliminary determinations, responses, and final 
determinations under this section”). 
375 See Dodd--Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 932(a)(8), 124 Stat. 1376, 
1878 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(p)(3)(C) (2012)). 
376 See Zaring, supra note 194, at 209.  
377 See supra note 374 and accompanying text. 
378 They do not, for instance, post company-specific or inspection-specific information. See, e.g., Compliance, FERC, 
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Additionally, in many agency-specific statutes, Congress overlooked monitoring. The main regulator 
of offshore oil platforms, for instance, must publish information about its postaccident investigations, 
but not its regular inspections.379 
Moreover, many transparency mandates focus on aggregate disclosures, which provide 
limited insight. An agency that conducts fewer examinations over time may be doing so because 
industry has captured it or because it is conducting more thorough examinations. An agency meting 
out fewer regulatory-monitor sanctions for violations could mean less vigilant agencies or more 
compliant firms.  
The design of many monitoring-transparency statutes also leaves open a window for 
obfuscation. For example, although the Clean Air Act mandates the publication of any preliminary 
audit determinations, it does not require a decision or report upon inspection, stating only that 
regulators “may issue the owner or operator of a stationary source a written preliminary 
determination.”380 That leaves the sequence of decisionmaking unclear as to what the frontline 
inspector’s determinations were, rather than the managerial pressures that followed. In contrast, in 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, for instance, Congress mandated that “prior to leaving the 
premises, the officer or employee making the inspection shall give to the owner, operator, or agent in 
charge a report in writing . . . . A copy of such report shall be sent promptly to the [Health and 
Human Services] Secretary.”381 
One policy response would be to require more comprehensive transparency. Default 
requirements might include those adopted by the FDA, such as (1) visibility into the entire 
regulatory-monitor chain of command; and (2) identification of the company. Transparency has 
well-known drawbacks that would need to be considered before expanding it. In particular, 
transparency could prompt firms to stem the exchange of regulatory information to avoid more 
stringent regulation.382 And chain-of-command disclosures may also leave much unclear, as “the 
inner workings of complex bureaucracies [cannot] be captured neatly in charts or guidelines.”383 
Some activities might need to remain private due to the necessity of protecting companies’ trade 
secrets. Transparency has also been used as a political tool for deregulatory goals.384  
But even without identifying the company, chain-of-command reports can have value. If the 
number of overturned frontline regulatory-monitor decisions changes significantly over time, the 
reports could suggest that leaders are captured by industry or that they are inadequately supervising 
frontline monitors. The data could also enable third parties to identify regulatory-monitor best 
practices or abuses of power. A recent study of publicly available health inspection microdata found 
                                                                  
https://www.ferc.gov/enforcement/compliance.asp [https://perma.cc/LD9K-A83J] (last updated Nov. 16, 2017). 
379 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331--1356b (2012 & Supp. I 2014) (detailing the Department of the 
Interior’s responsibilities). 
380 40 C.F.R. § 68.220(e) (emphasis added). 
381 21 U.S.C. § 374(b) (2012) (emphasis added).  
382 See Coglianese et al., supra note 37, at 290--92. 
383 See Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, supra note 42, at 482. 
384 See generally David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 Yale L.J. 100, 102 (2018) (arguing that the 
dominant policy rationale for increased government transparency in the twenty-first century emphasizes the capacity of 
transparency mechanisms “to make government leaner and less intrusive”). 
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that inconsistent application of the law subjected restaurants to an “inspector lottery.”385 At least one 
agency subsequently adopted institutional improvements indicated by those findings.386 For such 
advancements to be made, external parties need access to data. Despite limits, transparency 
mechanisms can improve public oversight of regulatory monitors and those who seek to coopt 
them.  
 
2. Private Paper Trails  
 
Given the limits on public disclosures, Congress has sometimes turned to private 
disclosures. Even when kept private, an agency paper trail could deter problematic managerial 
behavior because it leaves open the possibility of subsequent investigation. For example, OCC 
examiner Victor Del Tredici caught a bank president illegally diverting loan fees into his personal 
account,387 but Del Tredici’s superiors ignored his report for nine months.388 After the bank failed 
and its president went to jail, Congressional inquiries into the agency’s inaction on the report 
publicly embarrassed OCC leadership, even though the report itself had been private.389 The paper 
trail also helped restore Del Tredici’s standing after OCC leadership had stripped him of his 
authorities over the incident.390 A manager made aware of the possibility of subsequent legal 
investigations or public criticism is more likely to internalize diverse constituents’ views---an 
“observer effect.”391  
Mandated paper trails for manager reviews have other accountability benefits, which can be 
more broadly defined to include the effective exercise of government power. A paper trail makes 
reviews more likely to happen in the first place, which is important because reviews can improve the 
accuracy of frontline decisions.392 Also, managerial reviews of regulatory monitors help fulfill what is 
arguably a “constitutional duty to supervise” agency employees.393  
 
                     
385 See Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 Yale L.J. 574, 574, 635--
38 (2012) (analyzing data from a restaurant-sanitation grading system in New York and concluding that grade distributions are 
“essentially random” and that current grades have little correlation with grades in future inspection cycles). 
386 Ho, Does Peer Review Work?, supra note 47, at 1. This field experiment tested a mechanism indicated as significant by 
the original database study. See id. at 11--13.  
387 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Quiet Hero: Victor Del Tredici and the Fall of the San Francisco National 
Bank, https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/history/victor-del-tredici-article.pdf [https://perma.cc/PFG8-C4KL] 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2018).  
388 See id. 
389 Eugene N. White, The Comptroller and the Transformation of American Banking, 1960--1990, at 7 (1992).  
390 See id. 
391 Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference, 
82 Fordham L. Rev. 827, 862 (2013) (“The premise of the observer effect is that the executive responds to certain or probable 
judicial [scrutiny] . . . . [T]he executive is more likely to perceive that a court may intervene . . . when the courts sense a shift in 
[public opinion].”). 
392 See, e.g., Ho, Does Peer Review Work?, supra note 47, at 96 (noting that a paper trail makes direct oversight easier, 
which in turn enables supervisors to moderate inconsistencies between decisions made by frontline monitoring staff). 
393 See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 Yale L.J. 1836, 1874--904 (2015) (defining the “duty 
to supervise,” describing its constitutional basis, and delineating its scope).  
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3. Statutory Minimums  
 
Whereas both public disclosures and private paper trails rely on informational mechanisms, 
Congress can impose direct constraints through statutory “timing rules.”394 Lawmakers sometimes 
imposed a minimum frequency of inspections along with the original authorization of monitoring 
authority.395 More often, however, minimums were mandated or increased in response to an often-
observed regulatory pattern in which “[h]istory keeps repeating itself.”396 After monitoring authority 
already existed in an industry, subsequent oil spills,397 economic crises,398 mining deaths,399 and food 
poisoning outbreaks400 have led Congress to impose activity floors, such as annual inspections. 
These minimums guard against the “problem of public underinvestment in information.”401  
Minimums alone, like transparency or paper trails, have limits. Regulatory monitors may not 
comply with legislative agendas, particularly following budget cuts.402 Indeed, agencies such as the 
EPA usually face more than ten deadlines in a given year across all of their activities, and sometimes 
over fifty deadlines.403 Courts have shown a willingness to compel agencies to take action after 
                     
394 Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 543, 545 (2007) (“A timing 
rule, as we define it, is a rule that substantially affects the timing of a government action, including legislation and executive 
action.”).  
395 See, e.g., Burke, supra note 106, at 15 (noting semiannual inspections of steamboats). 
396 George M. Burditt, The History of Food Law, 50 Food & Drug L.J. (Special Issue) 197, 200 (1995). 
397 Deepwater Report, supra note 5, at 28--30 (describing government reaction to a series of offshore disasters); see also 
43 U.S.C. § 1348(c) (2012) (providing for “scheduled onsite inspection” and “periodic onsite inspection without advance 
notice” of offshore facilities subject to environmental regulation). 
398 White, supra note 89, at 31; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a--78qq (2012).  
399 Federal Coal Mine Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 82-552, §202(a), 66 Stat. 692, 693 (1952) (repealed 1969) (requiring annual 
inspections in some coal mines); Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, §103(a), 83 Stat. 742, 
749 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C. (2012)) (mandating four annual inspections at each underground 
coal mine); Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, § 103(a), 91 Stat. 1290, 1297 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.) (requiring at least four annual inspections for all underground mines 
and at least two annual inspections for all surface mines); Anne Marie Lofaso, What We Owe Our Coal Miners, 5 Harv. L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 87, 98 (2011) (“[T]he Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 . . . came after the Farmington No. 9 mine 
explosion in West Virginia . . . . In response to the 1976 Scotia mine disaster in Kentucky, . . . Congress passed the 1977 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act . . . .”).  
400 See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, sec. 421(a), 124 Stat. 3885, 3923 (2012) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 350j(a)(1) (2011)) (providing that the “Secretary shall identify high-risk facilities and shall allocate 
resources to inspect [food manufacturing] facilities according to the known safety risks of the facilities”); Jacobs, supra note 
115, at 600--01 (positing that, although crises are not the only factor motivating the passage of new legislation, many “key food 
and drug laws” can be “trac[ed] . . . to calamities in the last century”). High-risk facilities must be inspected at least every three 
years. 21 U.S.C. § 350j(a)(2)(B). 
401 See Stephenson, supra note 35, at 1427--37 (suggesting solutions for the problem of “misalignment” between the 
“marginal social costs . . . [and] the relevant government agent's private marginal costs,” which “leads to socially suboptimal 
investment in information”). 
402 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 05-08-001-06-001, Underground Coal Mine Inspection Mandate Not Fulfilled Due 
to Resource Limitations and Lack of Management Emphasis 1 (2007), https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2008/05-
08-001-06-001.pdf [https://perma.cc/RWQ8-6XZQ] (reporting that the Mining Safety and Health Administration “did not 
complete one or more statutorily-required inspections at 107 . . . of the Nation’s 731 underground coal mines” in part due to 
the Administration’s “decreasing inspection resources”). 
403 Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 923, 982 fig.2 (2008). 
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missing deadlines.404 But the “end-game” in such situations is unclear because higher courts have 
“exhibited a virtually complete unwillingness” to imprison agency leaders.405 Moreover, agencies can 
satisfy minimums perfunctorily, as many believe bank regulators did leading up to the financial 
crisis.406 Minimums may also hinder agencies’ ability to adjust to fast-changing markets if, for 
example, effective remote monitoring becomes achievable. 
Still, legislative strictures generally, and deadlines in particular, likely influence agencies.407 
Even independent regulators, over which Congress has less influence, report compliance with 
statutory floors.408 Regulatory monitors are highly skilled and likely could have earned more working 
elsewhere, which means some are presumably driven by a sense of public service. Allowing these 
employees to evaluate questionable business conduct could provide avenues for prompting 
enforcement, even in a captured agency. For example, the regulatory monitors might convince 
reluctant superiors to take action.  
Statutory minimums also undermine industry capture of agencies because of leaks. In 2013, 
Federal Reserve compliance examiner Carmen Segarra unsuccessfully asked her superiors to take 
action against Goldman Sachs.409 She later released forty-six taped hours of “cozy” conversations 
between examiners and bankers, and nonaction despite “window dressing” of reports and “shady” 
behavior.410 The incident prompted congressional scrutiny and foreshadowed later criminal charges 
resulting from blurred lines between the regulator and bank.411 Other bureaucrats have used 
Wikileaks to reveal documents.412 Whether these avenues improve governance is beyond the scope 
of the current discussion. Nonetheless, minimums can stifle complacency and capture by forcing 
agencies to deploy resolute regulatory monitors. 
                     
404 See id. at 952--54 (noting that despite limits on judicial review of agency inaction, missed statutory deadlines “may spur 
a court to order the agency to act, but will almost never allow the court to specify the content of that action”). 
405 Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt 
Power, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 685, 697 (2018); see also Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 403, at 964 (“Most statutes that impose 
deadlines are silent about what should happen if the agency misses the deadline.”). 
406 See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 52, at 2041--45 (explaining various ways in which financial regulators may be captured by 
industry). 
407 See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 403, at 977 (“Deadlines likely force agencies to reallocate resources away from 
programs without deadlines and toward programs with deadlines.”); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, 
Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345, 383 (2000) (noting that legislatures “exercise 
control over agencies by drafting and revising statutes governing agency authority, authorizing appropriations, and monitoring 
agencies’ activities”). 
408 See, e.g., FDIC, 2016 Annual Report 25 (2016), 
https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/2016annualreport/2016ar_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZ7M-82DH] (stating 
in its annual report that “the FDIC conducted all required . . . examinations”). 
409 Jake Bernstein, The Carmen Segarra Tapes, ProPublica (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/the-
carmen-segarra-tapes [https://perma.cc/B5VL-7AD7]. 
410 See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Sen. Sherrod Brown) (then quoting former Federal Reserve 
Senior Supervisory Bank Examiner for Goldman Sachs Michael Silva). 
411 See Ben Protess & Peter Eavis, Ex-Goldman Banker and Fed Employee Will Plead Guilty in Document Leak, N.Y. 
Times (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/27/business/dealbook/criminal-charges-and-50-million-fine-
expected-in-goldman-new-york-fed-case.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  
412 David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of 
Information, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 512, 514 (2013). 
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Another mechanism for involving heightened oversight is through the appointments 
process. Many agencies’ legal division heads are considered “inferior officers,” which triggers an 
appointment process mandated by the Constitution.413 That process can enable external stakeholders 
to have a say in whether the appointee is fit for a post that could have a major effect on people’s 
rights. The heads of large regulatory monitoring groups are not seen as requiring appointments, 
whereas some attorney leaders are.414  
This appointments asymmetry may in some cases be inconsistent with the actual influence 
that monitors have on the administration of the law. Directors of regulatory monitors in some 
agencies have similar or greater ability to oversee the final legal rights of regulated entities as do 
those leading attorney divisions.415 Congress has in the past recognized the appropriateness of 
overseeing the appointment of regulatory monitors. In 1852, lawmakers required the bureaucrats 
who managed steamboat inspectors to be appointed by the President.416  
Given the size of the federal bureaucracy today, it may not be practical to require an 
appointments process for all federal employees who have a significant effect on rights. But the 
appointments process offers a potential additional mechanism for ensuring that the individuals 
entrusted with monitoring are fit for their immense power. At the very least, it is worth reexamining 
the statutory designation of monitor leaders for appointments processes to remove any 
inconsistencies with comparable attorney counterparts.  
 
B.  Internal Accountability: Lawyers and Monitors as Rivals and Reviewers  
 
Scholars have in recent years shown how internal “administrative rivals---perhaps as much as 
Congress, the President, and the courts---shape agency behavior.”417 That literature has focused on 
other groups or functions: how civil servants can check agency leaders,418 how separation of 
                     
413 The Supreme Court has recently resolved a circuit split about the meaning of “officer,” finding that administrative law 
judges are officers subject to the Appointments Clause. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055--56 (2018). 
414 Cf. U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 76-304, United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions, at v (2012), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-PLUMBOOK-2012/pdf/GPO-PLUMBOOK-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/595H-
NRR7] (listing the types of appointments required for various government positions). 
415 See supra section III.B. 
416 See Burke, supra note 106, at 20. 
417 Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of 
Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 227, 229 (2016) (describing the dynamic among three categories of “rivalrous actors” internal to the 
administrative state: political appointees, career civil servants, and a “large and diverse civil society” that participates in 
administrative policymaking); see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous 
Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006) (arguing that “bureaucracy creates a civil service not beholden to any 
particular administration” that “promote[s] internal separation of powers”); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent 
Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L.J. 423, 425--26 (2009) (describing the reciprocal 
relationship between “internal and external checks on the Executive Branch”). 
418 See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 417, at 236--38. 
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enforcers and adjudicators advances due process,419 and how little-noticed inspectors general provide 
agency oversight from within.420 This Article underscores how regulatory monitors---including those 
who lead them---are also a potentially influential internal actor who can help contribute to a healthy 
balance of internal agency power.421 Three fundamental design decisions influence the extent to 
which regulatory monitors operate as agency rivals: resource allocation, formal appeals processes, 
and cross-functional independence.  
 
1. Resource Allocation 
 
Agency architects have settled on greatly differing allocation of resources to regulatory 
monitors---from comprising almost all of the enforcement workforce to almost none.422 A crucial 
agency-specific question is what regulatory-monitor allocations are optimal, weighing the costs of 
different regulatory configurations and the benefits in terms of deterrence and, ultimately, general 
welfare. Definitive answers to such complex questions must await empirical studies comparing 
different monitoring models in similar contexts. One hypothesis to test is whether a balance of 
powers provides benefits over the alternatives. 
There are reasons to posit that hybrid agencies might function best. At one extreme, 
agencies with limited regulatory-monitor power presumably risk being too blind to regulate 
effectively. The many historical examples of crises associated with insufficient monitoring lend 
support to this hypothesis.423 Additionally, observers in different regulatory spheres have recently 
identified many legal problems in need of greater agency monitoring, particularly in areas governed 
by litigator-dominant agencies. Professor Scott Hemphill and I have, for different reasons, called for 
the FTC to use monitoring authority more for antitrust and consumer protection.424 A government 
task force concluded that the EEOC should collect more data to identify systemic discrimination.425 
And Professor Frank Pasquale has argued that more monitoring of medical devices could save 
lives.426 
                     
419 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 24, at 890, 896. 
420 See generally Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Security Oversight, 65 
Stan. L. Rev. 1027 (2013) (EP). Inspectors general are different from inspectors, with the former inspecting government actors 
and the latter inspecting private (external-to-the-agency) entities. 
421 This issue touches on two larger debates that scholars have covered. The first is the tradeoffs between lawyers and 
technocrats. See generally Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (2009) (EP). 
Second, scholars have explored how to design agencies for the optimal collection of information. See generally Stephenson, 
supra note 35 (offering a framework for designing public institutions with adequate incentives for acquiring policy-relevant 
information). 
422 See supra section III.A. 
423 See supra section I.C. 
424 See C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug 
Competition, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 643 (2009); Van Loo, supra note 246, at 1311. 
425 See Leslie E. Silverman et al., EEOC, Systemic Task Force Report 11--12 (2006), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_reports/upload/systemic.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8JR-52JF].  
426 See Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 Md. L. Rev. 682, 683 
(2013) (arguing that “[p]roviders have kept vital information about price, quality, and access secret to maintain a competitive 
advantage or hide shortcomings” and have thus “impeded the types of large-scale analysis common in other industries”). 
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At the other extreme, it is important to study the potential pitfalls of overreliance on 
regulatory monitors. This inquiry takes on particular importance in light of new governance models 
that might drive the administrative state toward greater reliance on administrative monitors.427 
Policymakers have repeatedly turned to litigators following monitor-dominant regulators’ failures. 
After the 1990 Exxon Valdez oil tanker crashed into an Alaskan reef, releasing eleven million barrels 
of oil,428 Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act to strengthen oil regulators’ civil penalties.429 The 
2002 Enron scandal “converted FERC from an economic regulator to an enforcement agency” by 
prompting an expansion of FERC’s ability to prosecute “market manipulation.”430 Following the 
2008 financial crisis, lawyers began to play a larger role at bank regulators.431 Each of these agencies, 
prior to the scandal, was monitor-dominant.432  
Capture by industry is a common explanation for such failures.433 Regulatory monitors’ 
regular and frequent contact with businesses may make them particularly susceptible to leniency, 
giving them “empathy bred by personal contact.”434 Lawyers are not immune to capture or what is 
sometimes given as its principal explanation, the revolving door of employees working for regulators 
one day and regulated entities the next.435 But enforcement lawyers’ more arms-length removal from 
industry---and perhaps their unique professional thought process436---could make resource allocation 
to them an internal agency check on monitors’ likelihood of capture. Resource allocation to 
monitors, on the other hand, helps ensure an agency does not operate in the dark. 
                     
427 See supra section II.A. 
428 Alan Taylor, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: 25 Years Ago Today, Atlantic (Mar. 24, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/03/the-exxon-valdez-oil-spill-25-years-ago-today/100703/ (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
429 See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
33, 43, and 46 U.S.C. (2012)). 
430 Principal, SJC Energy Consultants, LLC, http://courtenergy.com (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited 
Oct. 12, 2018) (describing the effect of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 from the perspective of having been the Director of 
Enforcement); see also Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 315, 1284, 119 Stat. 594, 691, 980 (2005) (codified at 
16 U.S.C. §§ 825o-1, 824v (2012)). 
431 See Conti-Brown, supra note 101, at 93 [source PDF?]. 
432 The Enron scandal shifted FERC from a regulatory, monitor-driven agency into a litigator-driven one. See Impacts of 
H.R. 3795, the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009, on Energy Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Energy & the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 14--15 (2009) (testimony of Jon Wellinghoff, 
Chairman, FERC) (noting that the FERC’s “oversight and enforcement ha[d] increased greatly” since 2005 and that, by 2009, 
FERC had grown its investigatory staff from 14 attorneys to 180); Interview with FERC Employee (Apr. 5, 2017). Banking and 
oil regulators remain regulatory monitor dominant. See infra Appendix A. 
433 See Deepwater Report, supra note 5, at 77--78 (describing a culture in some offices of the federal Minerals 
Management Service of “accepting gifts from oil and gas companies,” which “cast[s] a shadow on an entire bureau” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter from Earl E. Devaney, Inspector Gen., to Dirk Kempthorne, Sec’y, Dep’t of the 
Interior 3 (Sept. 9, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Dep’t of the Interior, Office of the Inspector Gen., 
Investigative Report: Island Operating Company et al 1 (May 25, 2010), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=24383 
[https://perma.cc/59FV-MD57]; Levitin, supra note 52, at 2041--49. 
434 Cf. Diver, supra note 41, at 286 (describing a “sense of empathy or allegiance bred by personal contact or professional 
kinship” that can cause inspectors to “become reluctant to report violations”). 
435 See, e.g., David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 507, 511--12 (describing and 
critiquing common concerns about the revolving door). 
436 See generally Schauer, supra note 421 (EP). 
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2. Appeals  
 
Formal appeals provide a potential check on some regulatory-monitor actions. Some 
regulatory-monitor enforcement decisions, such as those suspending access to markets, constitute 
final agency actions, trigger formal administrative processes, and will likely get transferred to legal 
groups and ultimately public courts if appealed.437 However, Congress has typically imposed less 
procedural oversight of regulatory monitors. A Department of the Interior authorizing statute 
requires formal adjudicative processes including, for example, subpoena power mirroring that in 
“the district courts of the United States” for offshore oil platform investigations, but not for 
inspections.438 The CFPB’s founding statute requires administrative law appeals for CFPB 
enforcement actions, but not for examination findings.439 Such agency-specific statutes mirror the 
APA’s exemption of “proceedings in which decisions rest solely on inspections.”440 
Despite statutory lenience regarding regulatory-monitor appeals, some agencies have built 
formal processes enabling firms to appeal regulatory monitors’ decisions, even when not required by 
statute. One model leaves appeals within the regulatory-monitor chain of command.441 That 
procedural design would lessen the influence of the frontline monitor, but overall still retain 
enforcement influence within the larger monitoring group. Other agencies have routed regulatory 
monitors’ appeals outside the monitor group, such as through administrative law judges.442  
These design choices have limits. Even when agencies set up an appeals process outside the 
regulatory-monitor group, the fear of informal repercussions, such as a damaged relationship and 
stricter inspections, may deter the use of such appeals processes. Additionally, for many decisions, 
such as a temporary halting of activities or blocking of a chicken entering the stream of commerce, 
the appeals process may be impractical given the magnitude or timing of the decision.  
 
3. Monitor--Lawyer Teams and Rivalries 
 
Once an agency’s leaders have decided to deploy both regulatory monitors and regulatory 
lawyers, a number of questions remain about how these groups should interact on an ongoing basis. 
Numerous models exist. At some agencies, lawyers and monitors function as teammates. At others, 
enforcement lawyers “become prisoners of the work done by inspectors.”443 
                     
437 See, e.g., Biber & Ruhl, supra note 13, at 145--48.  
438 See 43 U.S.C. § 1348(c)--(d), (f) (2012). 
439 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5515(e)(1), 5516(c), 5563 (2012). 
440 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2012). 
441 See, e.g., Cooper & Fleder, supra note 304, at 492 (FDA appeals); CFPB, Appeal of Supervisory Matters [pincite] 
(2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201510_cfpb_appeals-of-supervisory-matters.pdf [https://perma.cc/PUY2-
W3CR] (CFPB appeals). 
442 See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. § 290.2 (permitting those adversely affected by a final decision of an official from the Department 
of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to appeal the decision to the Department’s Interior Board 
of Land Appeals). 
443 Cf. Diver, supra note 41, at 280 (characterizing inspectors’ role in the enforcement process).  
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As discussed above, various organizational design choices influence the extent to which 
agency lawyers and monitors are interdependent. When lawyers are required to have visibility into 
monitors’ activities, such as through the mandatory sharing of inspection reports, lawyers become 
more independent in taking action. When monitors receive sanction authority, they become more 
independent in securing compliance.444 
Even hybrid agencies have deployed greatly divergent models for how their powerful groups 
of monitors and lawyers should interact. The CFPB organizationally imposes more separation 
between the two groups. CFPB examiners and lawyers coordinate some actions.445 But they 
organizationally occupy separate offices and ultimately can pursue separate tracks for resolving even 
multimillion-dollar wrongdoing.446  
In contrast, the EPA does not organizationally separate out the inspection function.447 Once 
inspectors identify anything beyond a minor violation, they work side by side with lawyers. EPA 
collaboration means that both engineers and lawyers are often involved in deciding on sanctions, 
negotiating with firms, and even coauthoring legal briefs.448 Consequently, each meaningful 
regulatory-monitor decision is peer-reviewed both by someone trained within a professional code of 
ethics for the administration of justice and by someone familiar with the science and corporate 
culture.449  
The organizational relationships between lawyers and regulatory monitors presumably can 
influence enforcement and policy outcomes. Some agencies’ enforcement orders make it clear that 
they believe lawyer-monitor organizational design matters---albeit for private entities. The SEC and 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have mandated that malfeasant companies 
separate their compliance and legal departments.450 In other words, the SEC and HHS have 
mandated for businesses a level of separation that the EPA does not have for its own lawyers and 
compliance-related personnel. To the extent the company’s compliance and legal departments serve 
as internal regulators, similar organizational principles may be appropriate for both public and 
private monitors.451  
Since these organizational questions about regulatory monitor--lawyer peer review and 
independence have yet to be studied, it is difficult to assess the merits of these approaches.452 But 
                     
444 See supra section III.B. 
445 Cf. Witkowski, supra note 73 (“[E]nforcement attorneys will continue to coordinate with examiners offsite.”). 
446 See supra notes 351--353 and accompanying text (discussing the separate tracks); Bureau Structure, CFPB, 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure [https://perma.cc/J3G3-7DYQ] (last visited Oct. 
12, 2018) (showing a separate office for supervision examinations and enforcement). 
447 See EPA Organization Chart, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-organization-chart [https://perma.cc/4L3R-
L6QU] (last visited Oct. 12, 2018). 
448 See Interview with EPA, supra note 312; see also Joel A. Mintz, Enforcement at the EPA 113 (rev. ed. 2012). 
449 See Interview with EPA, supra note 312. See generally Schauer, supra note 421 (discussing lawyers’ approach to 
reasoning). Peer review alone can improve regulatory-monitor performance. See Ho, Does Peer Review Work?, supra note 47, 
at 79--82 (discussing the evidence that shows how peer review can improve the accuracy and consistency in administering the 
law). 
450 For a critique of these mandates, see DeStefano, supra note 203, at 122--55. 
451 See supra section II.A.2 (discussing self-regulation). 
452 Peer review of inspectors has been studied in great depth, but peer review across these two groups has not been. See 
supra notes 391--393 and accompanying text. Nor have scholars turned their attention to the ideal level of organizational 
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regulatory lawyers and regulatory monitors have different expertise, worldviews, and legal authority. 
It is plausible that a set of agency-mandated processes for cross-functional peer review and 





Scholars commonly describe agencies as engaging in ex ante rulemaking and ex post 
enforcement. Ongoing monitoring should be added to that standard account of agency activity and 
studied more closely. Regardless, the traditional aim of administrative law---designing accountability 
mechanisms such as transparency and appeals---could better reflect the tripartite nature of 
regulators’ legal functions.  
Additionally, those who regularly extract information from firms influence much of the 
administrative state’s law-related activity. Any regulatory analysis that ignores regulatory monitors or 
groups them together with enforcement actors risks obscuring agencies’ vital “internal laws.”453 This 
self-regulating administrative-monitoring ecosystem is ripe for systematic study to identify best 
practices for weeding out extremes of overbearing, blind, or captured agencies. A key question is 
how much of the existing regulatory-monitor structure should be ingrained in the law rather than 
left to bureaucratic discretion or control by the President. 
Perhaps most importantly, regulatory-monitor resource allocation and intergroup processes 
should be added to the toolbox for designing agencies to increase effectiveness and accountability.454 
Regulatory monitors are vital to the front line of business compliance. But lawyers---as judges, 
drafters of laws, and intra-agency rivals---are the “foot soldiers of our Constitution.”455 The 
organizational design of these two groups’ intersection is crucial to a healthy system of checks and 
balances with regulatory monitors as a powerful internal branch of administration. 
  
                                                                  
dependence among regulatory monitors and regulatory lawyers. 
453 Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 223, at 443 (“Bureaucratic institutions have their own internal laws, expressed both in 
regulation and in routine.”). 
454 For an overview of anticapture organizational-design mechanisms, see generally Barkow, supra note 55.  
455 Lee R. West, Judicial Independence: Our Fragile Fortress Against Elective Tyranny, 34 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 59, 73 
(2009) (quoting Rennard Strickland & Frank T. Read, The Lawyer Myth: A Defense of the American Legal Profession 13 
(2008)). 
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* * * 
 
 
Appendix A: Employees and Monitoring456  
 
The nineteen large regulators are the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Food Safety & Inspection Service (FSIS), Mine 
Safety & Health Administration (MSHA), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commissions (EEOC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB), Nuclear Regulatory Council (NRC), and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). Data in the appendices aim to provide a survey of the level of activity across large regulators, 
but should not be viewed as comprehensive. Additionally, the data provide a snapshot based on the 
most recent year readily available, and activity may vary over time. Drawing firm conclusions about 
the level of monitoring and the number of monitor employees would for many agencies require a 









Annual Monitor Activity 
CFPB 416  349  54% 177 examinations and related457 
FSIS 8,107 440 95% 1.7 million products inspected458 
FERC 509459 
 
308 62% 398 account reviews, 423 reports, 
2,330 inspections460 
                     
456 Unless otherwise specified, figures are all examiner, inspection, or compliance positions for regulatory monitors and all 
Legal and Kindred employees from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management. See FedScope, supra note 75. Monitor Percent 
= Monitor Personnel / (Monitor Personnel + Legal Personnel). Figures reflect those reported through the end of 2016, 
although some figures have been updated since then. 
457 CFPB, CFPB Strategic Plan, Budget, and Performance Plan and Report 38--40 (2016), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201602_cfpb_report_strategic-plan-budget-and-performance-plan_FY2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MB3T-X7X6] (listing “supervisory activities”). For a review of the CFPB’s early examination activities, see 
generally Jean Braucher & Angela Littwin, Examination as a Method of Consumer Protection, 87 Temp. L. Rev. 807 (2015). 
458 U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Quarterly Enforcement Report 1, https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/2065d220-
1e88-4cf4-bdf9-d02a8618d9c0/QER-Q1-FY17-Tables.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/VX39-MSPB] (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2018). 
459 This figure includes Accounting, Auditing, Engineering, and General Business. Interview with FERC, supra note 432 
(clarifying classifications). 
460 See FERC, Fiscal Year 2017 Congressional Performance Budget Request 48--51 (2017), 
https://www.ferc.gov/about/strat-docs/2016/FY17-Budget-Request.pdf [https://perma.cc/868P-C4AH].  
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Annual Monitor Activity 
FDA 11,493461 203 98% >160,000 inspections462 
MSHA 1,521463 141464 91% 19,642 inspections465 
OSHA 1,827466 277467 93% 35,822 inspections468 
FAA 4,388469 342 93% Inspect 227,900 aircraft470 
FMCSA 644471 46 93% 118,494 inspections472 
OCC 2,715 209 93% 768 applications473 
EPA 1,682474 1,102 60% 13,500 inspections475 
                     
461 This figure includes scientists, engineers, consumer protection, and medical officers. Telephone Interview with FDA 
Employee (March 24, 2017) (describing job responsibilities). 
462 See Compliance Check Inspections, supra note 289.  
463 Of these, about 1,145 actually conduct inspections, whereas the rest engage in related monitoring support and 
oversight activities. Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Report No. 05-10-001-06-001, Journeyman Mine 
Inspectors Do Not Receive Required Periodic Retraining 1--2 (2010), https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2010/05-
10-001-06-001.pdf [https://perma.cc/98RQ-MX99]. 
464 This figure was determined using the same methodology (for the same reasons) that was used to determine the legal 
personnel figure for OSHA. See infra note 467. 
465 U.S. Dept. of Labor, Agency Financial Report 19 (2016), 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/media_0/_Sec/2016annualreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3T9-Z5LY] (putting the 
figure at 3,095 for coal mines and 16,547 for metal and other noncoal mines). 
466 OSHA, FY 2017 Budget Justification, supra note 182, 28--29. 
467 Legal employees are listed as zero for OSHA in the database, because legal is centralized in the Department of Labor 
(DOL). This figure is calculated as “Legal and kindred” (except Worker’s Compensation Claims examiners) from DOL 
proportioned out to OSHA’s percent of DOL employees. See FedScope, supra note 75; Interview with OSHA, supra note 147 
(explaining how DOL solicitors serve the department’s various agencies). 
468 OSHA, supra note 182, at 45. This figure corresponds to the number of inspections performed in fiscal year 2015, not 
including inspections of federal agencies. 
469 This figure excludes 418 employees categorized as “General Inspection, Investigation, Enforcement, and Compliance,” 
due to the inability to obtain information differentiating the responsibilities within this category. 
470 FAA, FY 2009 Citizens’ Report: Summary of Performance and Financial Results 4 (2009), 
https://www.faa.gov/about/plans_reports/media/2009_Citizens_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/YMP7-D5NA]. This statistic 
is from fiscal year 2009 because the FAA has not published updated figures; however, the agency’s more recent reports 
indicate no lessening of inspection responsibilities. See, e.g., FAA, FY 2017 Performance and Accountability Report 50 (2017), 
https://www.faa.gov/about/plans_reports/media/2017_FAA_PAR.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ABR-8Y42] (“Since 2010, the 
FAA has seen an increase of approximately . . . 800 percent . . . in the number of inspections FAA performs to ensure safety 
compliance.”). 
471 See Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 2017 Pocket Guide to Large Truck and Bus Statistics 18 (June 2017), 
https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/files/docs/safety/data-and-statistics/81121/2017-pocket-guide-large-truck-
and-bus-statistics-final-508c-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KRF-WKJ6]. This figure counts only FMCSA Employees engaged 
in safety inspections, rather than the larger group of monitors, which would include managerial, support, and oversight 
positions, since they are not differentiated in the OPM database. Note that federal inspectors represent five percent of the total 
inspector force, most of whom are state employed. See id.  
472 See id. at 18. This total refers to the number of federal inspections conducted in 2016. 
473 2016 OCC Ann. Rep. 30, https://www.occ.gov/annual-report/download-the-full-report/annual-report-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P6D8-5H4L].  
474 This figure corresponds to employees categorized as “Environmental Engineers” in the OPM database. See FedScope, 
supra note 75; see also Joel A. Mintz, Enforcement at the EPA 11 (rev. ed. 2012) (confirming that the number of personnel 
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Annual Monitor Activity 
EEOC N/A 522 0% Analyses of 67,146 employer 
reports476  
FCC 308477 602478 34% Undisclosed number of radio 
inspections and transaction 
reviews479 
FDIC 2,719 454 86% 6,892 examinations480 
Federal 
Reserve 
1,382481 69482 95% 4,190483 
FTC 20484 711 3% ~1,200 merger transactions485  
                                                                  
conducting inspections for the EPA is approximately 1,600). 
475 Enforcement Annual Results Numbers at a Glance for Fiscal Year 2016, EPA, 
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/enforcement/enforcement-annual-results-numbers-glance-fiscal-year-2016.html 
[https://perma.cc/XML8-WGUM] (last visited Oct. 11, 2018) (listing an overview of the enforcement numbers in the 
“Numbers at a Glance” tab). 
476 Agency Information Collection Activities: Revision of the Employer Information Report (EEO–1) and Comment 
Request, 81 Fed. Reg. 51,113, 51,115 (Feb. 1, 2016) (stating that there were 67,146 employer submitted EEO-1 reports for 
2014). 
477 This figure reflects Engineers and Analysts from FedScope, supra note 75. Interview with FCC, supra note 292 
(explaining employee breakdowns).  
478 This figure is roughly evenly divided between enforcement and other legal functions, such as central legal staff and rule 
writers. See FCC, Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Estimates to Congress 12 (Feb. 2016) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating 
the enforcement division had 240 total employees in fiscal year 2016). 
479 See Inspection Fact Sheet, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/reports-research/guides/inspection-fact-sheet 
[https://perma.cc/STN2-FX8U] (last visited Nov. 8, 2018) (describing why and how FCC inspections of radio installations 
occur); Mergers and Acquisitions, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/proceedings-actions/mergers-and-acquisitions 
[https://perma.cc/THJ2-KFCG] (last visited Nov. 8, 2018) (describing the FCC's responsibility for reviewing business 
transactions in which an FCC license will be transferred). The FCC does not provide readily accessible data about its 
monitoring activities, making it difficult to assess how extensively it uses its monitoring authority. Interviews indicated, 
however, that the agency engages in regular inspections of radio stations and processing of information submitted by 
businesses. See Interview with FCC, supra note 292.  
480 FDIC, 2016 Annual Report 25 (2017), 
https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/2016annualreport/2016ar_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BFP-J78Q].  
481 See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 102nd Annual Report 2015, at 308 (2015), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/annual-report/files/2015-annual-report.pdf (noting that full-time employees in 
the Boston branch of the Federal Reserve account for approximately 5.79% of 16,686 total employees); Interview with Federal 
Reserve Employee in Bos., Mass. (Mar. 22, 2017) [hereinafter Federal Reserve Interview] (estimating that the Boston Office 
has eighty examiners and four lawyers). The figures in this table assume that Boston reflects national Federal Reserve 
breakdown. The Federal Reserve is not included in the OPM data and does not release examiner breakdowns. 
482 See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 481, at 308; Federal Reserve Interview , supra note 481. 
483 See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 481, at 308; Federal Reserve Interview, supra note 481. 
484 This figure is an estimate of the number of employees who work on the Consumer Sentinel Network. See FTC 
Interview, supra note 277 (estimating the size of the Consumer Sentinel group); Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book 2017, 
FTC (March 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/commission-staff-reports/consumer-sentinel-
network-data-book-2017/main [https://perma.cc/M3SA-L7LN] (explaining that the Consumer Sentinel Network stores 
consumer complaints from various data contributors and makes them available to law enforcement).  
485 This figure is limited to Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR) transactions. Since the annual aggregate figures released 
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Annual Monitor Activity 
NCUA 886 31 97% 9,465 contacts486 
NLRB 0 797 0% Minimal clear monitoring487 
NRC 1,641 115 93% Continual presence, 99 plants488 
SEC 1,631489 1,466490 53% 2,400 examinations491 
 
 








Monitor Formal Charges 
CFPB $44 million in redress492 -- -- 
FSIS  25,516 noncompliances 
documented493 
Pre-approve each meat 
and poultry product494 
-- 
                                                                  
combine those for the FTC and DOJ, to estimate the HSR transactions reviewed by FTC monitors, this figure assumes that 
the total number of HSR transactions reviewed by each entity is proportional to the figures for acquisition clearance granted to 
each agency. See 2015 Fed. Trade Comm’n & Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div. Hart-Scott-Rodino Ann. Rep., at Exhibit A tbl.I, 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau-competition-department-justice-
antitrust-division-hart-scott-rodino/160801hsrreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2NV-5LDN] (noting that there were 1,794 total 
HSR transactions reviewed by both agencies, there were 179 clearances granted to the FTC, and there were 79 clearances 




486 Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 2016 Annual Report 13, https://www.ncua.gov/Legal/Documents/Reports/annual-
report-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/DBT4-J43N]. 
487 The closest activity to monitoring is the NLRB’s conducting of union elections. See supra note x and accompanying 
text. NLRB agents conducted 1,496 labor elections between October 1, 2015, and September 30, 2016. See NLRB, Election 
Report for Cases Closed Between 10/1/2015 and 9/30/2016, at 1 (2016), 
https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-4626/Total%20Elections%202016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H5QE-XG8C]; see also ABA, supra note 157 (explaining that the NLRB observes all union elections). 
488 See Power Reactors, Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/power.html [perma] (last updated Oct. 31, 
2018); A Day in the Life of an NRC Resident Inspector, NRC (Aug. 10, 2017), 
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1310/ML13107B418.pdf [perma].  
489 See SEC, FY 2017 Congressional Budget Justification 14 (2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy17congbudgjust.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TYX-UCQC] (providing figures for full-
time equivalent employees in fiscal year 2015). This figure reflects the number of full-time equivalents in fiscal year 2015 for 
employees labeled “Compliance, Inspections, and Examinations,” “Corporation Finance,” and “Trading and Markets,” since 
the database left the employee breakdown unclear for monitor-like activities conducted by groups like the “Economic and Risk 
Analysis” and “Investment Management” employees. See id.  
490 See id. This figure reflects the number of full-time equivalents in fiscal year 2015 for employees labeled “Enforcement” 
and “General Counsel.” Id. 
491 SEC, supra note 214, at ii.  
492 CFPB Spring 2016 Report, supra note 305, at 11. This figure represents the total amount of redress paid from October 
1, 2015 to March 31, 2016. See id. at 8. 
493 See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 458, at 1 tbl.1. 
494 Carmen Rottenberg, Food Safety Professionals Ensure that “What’s in Your Meat” Is Safe and Wholesome, USDA 
Food Safety & Inspection Serv. (Aug. 29, 2018), 
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Monitor Formal Charges 
FERC 214 recommendations, 
$5.3 million in refunds495  
-- Charge: license revocation496 
FDA 14,590 warning letters497  2,847 recalls498 Investigate: penalties & 
recommend charges499 
MSHA 97,255 citations and 
orders500 
Inspectors order mine 
evacuations501 
Charge: $48 million in civil 
penalties502 
OSHA 65,044 violations503 -- Charge: civil fines504 




Investigate: civil penalties, 
license507 








495 See FERC, supra note 260, at 5.  
496 See Interview with FERC, supra note 432 (noting that monitors have the authority to influence license revocations but 
that, in practice, licenses are almost never revoked). 
497 See FDA, supra note 303, at 1. 
498 See id. For additional context on the FDA’s recall procedure, see Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Office of Inspector 
General, A-01-15-01500, Early Alert: The Food and Drug Administration Does Not Have an Efficient and Effective Food 
Recall Initiation Process 1 (2016), https://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region1/11501500.pdf [https://perma.cc/6W53-VGQ8] 
(finding that the FDA does not have “an efficient and effective food recall initiation process that helps ensure the safety of the 
Nation’s food supply”). 
499 See FDA, Regulatory Procedures Manual ch.5, at 87 (2018). 
500 Dep’t of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Admin., Mine Safety and Health at a Glance 1 (July 7, 2017), 
https://www.msha.gov/sites/default/files/Data_Reports/msha-at-a-glance-7-7-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX8W-FEPG] 
(total number of citations and orders issued for calendar year 2016). 
501 Laura E. Beverage, Litigation Under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act Today: A Practical Guide, 16 Am. J. Trial 
Advoc. 305, 310--12 (1992) (“The inspector may issue a withdrawal order for the affected area . . . .”). 
502 Mine Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Mine Safety and Health at a Glance (2017), 
https://arlweb.msha.gov/mshainfo/factsheets/fy/at-a-glance-fy1984-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/KT8M-NQLT] (providing 
2016 figures); Mine Inspections, Mine Safety & Health Admin., https://www.msha.gov/compliance-enforcement/mine-
inspections [https://perma.cc/9GGU-3ZZF] (last visited Oct. 12, 2018) (describing the requirements of the MSHA, including 
inspections of underground mines four times a year and of surface mines twice a year). 
503 Occupational Safety and Health Administration Enforcement, OSHA, 
https://www.osha.gov/dep/2015_enforcement_summary.html [https://perma.cc/S6HA-TAG6] (last visited Oct. 12, 2018). 
504 See supra note 334. 
505 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 329, at 29--30. 
506 See FAA 2017 Performance and Accountability Report, supra note 470, at 12  (“The old standards ensured adequate 
levels of safety, but lacked flexibility to accommodate rapidly developing technological innovations. Today, instead of telling 
manufacturers how to build airplanes, the FAA’s regulations set performance standards and allow general aviation 
manufacturers to develop the designs and innovations to meet those standards.”); see also FAA, FY 2009 Citizens’ Report, 
supra note 470, at 6. Prior to issuing a voluntary automobile recall, the DOT requires monitoring groups to obtain consent 
from the legal department. See Interview with DOT Employee (Mar. 26, 2017). 
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Monitor Formal Charges 
FMCSA 35,756 Warning Letters508 Registers and audits 
new vehicle entrants509 
 
OCC Non-public MOUs and 
Commitment Letters510  
Pre-approve branches, 
notified of mergers511 
Charge: civil penalties, $226 
million512 
 
EPA Minor citations513 -- Joint charge: $6 billion in 
civil penalties514 
EEOC -- -- -- 













notified of mergers  
Charge: $2.2 billion in civil 
penalties520 
FTC -- -- -- 
NCUA 303 actions521 -- Charge: civil penalties522 
NLRB -- -- -- 
NRC 715 Non-cited violations; 




Investigate: civil money 
penalties & recommend 
charge525 
                                                                  
507 See Robinson, supra note 329, at 31. 
508 Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., supra note 471, at 28. 
509 49 C.F.R. § 385.319 (2008). The agency conducted 36,756 new entrant safety audits in 2016. See Fed. Motor Carrier 
Safety Admin., supra note 471, at 30. 
510 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Policies and Procedures Manual 15, 18 (Sept. 9, 2011), 
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/11/PPM-5310-3-Old-2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3AFT-T9DG]. 
511 See OCC 2016 Annual Report, supra note 473, at 31. 
512 See id. at 32; OCC, 2016 Bank Supervision, supra note 367, at 4--7.  
513 See Interview with EPA, supra note 312 (stating that notices of minor violations found in inspection can be sent to the 
company without legal review or enforcement action if corrected within thirty days). 
514 See EPA, Enforcement Annual Results for Fiscal Year 2016, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/enforcement/enforcement-
annual-results-fiscal-year-2016.html [https://perma.cc/2LW2-MBTP] (last visited Oct. 12, 2018); Interview with EPA, supra 
note 312. 
515 See Interview with FCC, supra note 292. 
516 See id. 
517 See id. 
518 FDIC, supra note 480, at 25--27. 
519 Interview with FDIC, supra note 304. 
520 See Federal Reserve Annual Report 2015, supra note 481, at 57. 
521 This figure is from 2016. See Nat’l Credit Union Admin., supra note 486, at 16.  
522 Interview with NCUA employee (Apr. 11, 2017).  
523 See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Enforcement Program Annual Report 4, 18 (2015), 
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Monitor Formal Charges 
SEC $60 million returned to 
investors in 2016526 
Firm licenses and 
suspension of trading527 
Charge: license528 Manage: 
$94 million in SRO fines529 
 
 
                                                                  
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1606/ML16069A146.pdf [https://perma.cc/4S2Z-8JHN]. See generally U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm’n, Enforcement Manual (2017), https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1026/ML102630150.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9L8L-DEAM] (explaining how inspections document violations). 
524 See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, supra note 523, at 26. 
525 Interview with NRC Employee (Apr. 11, 2017); U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, NRC Enforcement Policy 16--25 
(Nov. 2016), https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1627/ML16271A446.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EW3-DKQD]. 
526 See SEC, supra note 214, at 21. 
527 See, e.g., id. at 5 (mentioning registration); Statement on Order of Suspension of Trading of Certain Bitcoin/Ether 
Tracking Certificates, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/suspension-trading-certain-bitcoinether-tracking-
certificates [perma] (last visited Oct. 31, 2018) (providing an example of the Division of Trading and Markets and Division of 
Corporate Finance suspending trading); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 15, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78o (2012)) (describing the SEC’s registration requirements). 
528 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)--(vii) (1990).  
529 Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., supra note 210, at 3. 
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